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FOREWORD
The nature of the Russian state and the economy it
superintends raise more than academic questions, for
if we understand the nature of the state and its subordinated economy, we can then form an accurate vision
of what Russia’s overall policy and strategy will be.
We may say, euphemistically, that the beginning of
wisdom in understanding Russian policy and strategy
is to grasp the answers to key questions concerning
the nature of its political and economic processes. In
line with that approach to understanding Russia, the
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to present
the first volume of papers from its annual conference
on Russia conducted on September 26-27, 2011. The
resulting papers go straight to the heart of the most
important questions concerning the nature of the state
and the possibilities for its economic reform.
In the wake of Vladimir Putin’s return to the
presidency of Russia, those are, indeed, the crucial
categories of questions we must answer. SSI's annual
conference on Russia represents the institute's efforts,
together with those of a distinguished array of other
U.S., European, and Russian scholars, to answer the
questions and discern the trajectory of Russian developments as they occur. We do so in the belief that this
knowledge is not only valuable in its own right, but
that it also provides a valuable resource for experts
on Russia, interested laymen and, most of all, policymakers who must formulate policies dealing with
and/or affecting Russia, a country that deliberately
tries to remain opaque to foreign observers despite its
many changes. Accordingly, we hope that the papers
presented here and in subsequent volumes will both
enlighten and edify readers and stimulate the effort to
v

understand and deal with one of the most important
actors in international affairs today.

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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INTRODUCTION
These papers represent the first in a series of papers
taken from the Strategic Studies Institute’s (SSI) fourth
annual Russia conference that took place at SSI’s headquarters in Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. As
such, they also are part of our on-going effort to make
sense of and clarify developments in Russia. The three
papers presented here offer attempts to characterize
first of all, the nature of the state; second, the prospects for economic reform within that state—perhaps
the most pressing domestic issue and one with considerable spillover into defense and security agendas as
well—in contemporary Russia; and third, the nature
and lasting effects of the defense reform that began in
2008. The papers are forthright and pull no punches,
though we certainly do not claim that they provide
the last or definitive word on these subjects.
Nevertheless, for our readers in particular these
are the most crucial issues as we go forward, particularly after the recent reelection of Vladimir Putin
as President. Can or will Putin change the nature of
the state and economy? Though many doubt that he
either wants to, can, or will undertake the necessary
transformations of the political system, his actions
and those of his colleagues who today steer the ship
of state will tell us the answers to those issues. The
same question applies with equal, if not greater, intensity to the nature of the Russian economy. Likewise, it is essential for us to grasp how the military
reform launched in 2008 has changed and affected the
Russian armed forces and what their profile, outlook,
composition, and organization, not to mention their
doctrine, will look like going forward.
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These are critical questions for experts and policymakers alike. Interested laymen no doubt will also
find the proceedings of considerable interest, if not
actually provocative in their assessments. But as we
have noted, we do not aim at providing answers for
eternity, but at enhancing the understanding that only
comes about through controversy and reflection. We
therefore hope that the following essays will not only
pique our readers’ interests, but also force them to
think on a deeper plane about the inherent challenges
that Russia presents to us.
		
		
Professor Stephen J. Blank
		
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
RUSSIA’S CHOICE:
CHANGE OR DEGRADATION?
Lilia Shevtsova
The December 2011 protests have proved that ����
Russia has come to the point when the most educated and
forward looking segments of the society are starting to
realize that the personalized power system’s continued existence is leading to national and social degradation with potentially dramatic consequences for the
country. But����������������������������������������
���������������������������������������
this growing awareness has not yet produced any alternative that could secure broad political
and public support, and Russia thus continues down
its destructive road. Moreover, Vladimir Putin’s ruling team is going to reproduce the system during the
December 2011 and March 2012 “managed” elections.
In this chapter, I reflect on the nature of Russia’s
political system, the external factors influencing its
existence, the strategic implications of its degradation
and the prospects for its transformation.
SURVIVING WITHOUT CHANGE
Russia let slip an opportunity for liberal transformation at the moment the Soviet Union collapsed. A
number of circumstances complicated Russia’s transition to liberal democracy: history, traditions, culture,
an anti-Western nationalism, the need to accomplish
four revolutions (create a free market, build a new
state, democratize the regime, and let go of an imperial identity), reluctance to part with any sliver of its
sovereignty in order to integrate into Europe, and Eu-
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rope’s own unwillingness to offer effective external
incentives for Russia’s transformation. At the start of
the 20th century, it was Russian society that was not
yet ready to leave the traditional system behind, but
at the start of the 1990s, it was the Russian elite that
were not ready for this transformation. As the communist era came to an end, the blame for the failure
of Russia’s liberalization appeared to lie largely with
the seemingly liberal and democratic-minded groups,
who proved unable to offer society an alternative and
placed their hopes instead on a leader (Boris Yeltsin),
thus paving the way to a revival of the personalized
power model.
The Yeltsin, Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev presidencies saw the consolidation of a system based on
three fundamental principles borrowed from the past
(the Russian Matrix): personalized power, a merger
between government and property, and the atavism
of great power mentality (derzhavnichestvo) with its
claims to “spheres of influence.” This system’s builders gave it a makeover, however, wrapping up the old
concepts in a new packaging that imitated the principles on which Western civilization is based. One
cannot deny the Russian elite’s sense of irony anyway: they managed to create an alternative to liberal
civilization by imitating it. New Russia’s rulers had
not only to establish their hold on power, but also to
ensure that no challenge to their monopoly will arise
and they do so through the crucial instrument of managed elections. The Russian elite took the liberal election principle of “certain rules and uncertain results”
and turned it on its head, putting in place an electoral
system based on “uncertain rules and certain results.”
Elections devoid of political competition but where the
authorities manipulate public opinion have become a
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means for guaranteeing the ruling elite’s monopoly
hold on power.
One might ask, what happened to that other pillar
of the traditional matrix, militarism, which over time
had become such an intrinsic part of the existence of
Russia’s state and society? Historically, militarism,
and more specifically the constant search for an outside enemy, was not just the cornerstone of Russian
foreign policy, but also a means of consolidating elite
control over the population and part of daily life. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin abandoned the doctrine of total military confrontation with
the West, but retained aspects and symbols of militarism, which still often impose their logic on the current system.
Today’s new-look Russian system presents several
salient features, in particular the hybridization of economic, social, political, and foreign policy. This is reflected in adherence to mutually exclusive principles,
such as market and state control, paternalism and
Social Darwinism, and cooperation with and rejection
of the West. Ambiguous principles, absence of a clear
direction, the constant game of “Let’s pretend!” have
become a new Russian way of life. Meanwhile, having
abandoned ideology in typically post-modernist fashion, the Russian elite adopted pragmatism as its credo,
which it proclaims as its guiding light and source of
pride.
The Russian elite has also demonstrated considerable tactical skills. Let us not forget, though, that clever
tactics often mask an absence of strategic vision. The
authorities swing between repressive action and coopting of representatives of various social and political groups (nationalists, leftists, and liberals) into the
Kremlin’s orbit, thus discrediting the political currents
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they represent. The Kremlin has long realized that
any rhetoric and slogans can be manipulated for the
purpose of nipping the emergence of any opposition
in the bud. The elite use the impression of a change
in leadership, for example, to maintain its monopoly.
Putin did not try to guarantee his hold on power by
the blatantly unconstitutional means of running for a
third term in office as president, but instead took the
prime minister’s job and set up a tandem structure
with Medvedev, while keeping the real power in his
hands—this was a new way of reproducing the same
regime. The Kremlin also alternates between Russia’s
“special path,” and a supposed desire for European
integration. These constant zigzags and mutually
exclusive slogans demoralize and disorient society,
undermine its confidence in the future, and leave no
solid ground on which any real alternative can develop. In this unclear situation, the authorities look like
the only guarantor of stability. This imitation-based
system has proven an effective means of maintaining
the current ruling team in power. But its categorical
rejection of the principles of freedom and competition
undermine any hopes for and attempts at renewal and
modernization from inside.
Russia’s post-modern experiments have disproved
a number of axioms on democratic transition and
hybrid regimes. The fathers of democratic transition
theory held the view that, as Samuel Huntington said,
“the halfway house does not stand.”1 One could certainly imagine that hybrid systems built on mutually
exclusive principles cannot be stable and will eventually start to wobble. But this kind of political death can
be a very drawn-out process, it turns out. Indeed, it can
be precisely the existence of these mutually exclusive
principles that prolong the life of such hybrids. For ex-
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ample, the personal freedoms that let Russia’s people
live their lives independent of the authorities (under
the condition that they do not meddle in politics) and
Russia’s relative openness to the outside world lead to
apathy, emigration, and/or withdrawal into personal
life rather than to society trying to expand its freedoms. Instead of helping to shape and develop democratic habits, imitation of democratic institutions and
liberal rhetoric only discredits democratic principles.
Theorists say that the middle class is the foundation
of liberal democracy, but in Russia the middle class
provides the support for the centralized state. Another purely Russian paradox that helps to keep the personalized power alive is the destruction of traditions
and stereotypes existing before the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. The Communist period eradicated this
old mindset, but the Russian society it produced, now
atomized and deprived of its traditional social bonds
and aspirations, is inclined towards a new form of monopoly hold on power as a means of survival.
The West also plays a prominent part in keeping
Russia's authoritarianism alive. The Russian elite’s opportunities for personal integration in Western society
(as exemplified by Roman Abramovich, former governor of Chukotka and now one of Britain’s wealthiest
citizens), joint projects between Western and Russian
business, the efforts to draw Western intellectuals into
the projects of the Russian authorities, and the involvement of Western political circles’ in corrupt deals with
the Russian elite—all play a part in helping to keep the
system afloat.
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RUSSIA AS THE WEST’S PARTNER AND
OPPONENT
Foreign and security policy are other instruments
the Russian system uses to keep itself going. The nature and role of Russia’s foreign and security policy
come through above all in Russia’s relations with the
West. This is only natural, as it is Western civilization
that provides the alternative to Russia’s political model and at the same time the West is a refuge place for
the Russian elite. No matter whether or not Russian
foreign policy takes the form of dialogue or confrontation with the West, its aim remains to keep in place a
personalized power system that is inherently hostile
to liberal democracy. The optimists who get excited
every time the Kremlin starts cooperating with Western partners would do well to remember this.
Let us deliberate on how the domestic agenda influences foreign and security policies and makes them
its own instrument. The key goal of the Russian system domestically is to preserve the status quo, and first
of all, the ruling elite’s monopoly on power. Foreign
and security policies have to: 1) guarantee a benevolent international environment for the Russian system
and its international legitimacy (the latter becomes
crucial in the situation when the system is losing its
domestic legitimacy); 2) deliver additional drivers for
society’s consolidation around the authorities; 3) secure economic resources to support the system; and,
4) guarantee ways for personal integration of the Russian elite with the Western society (this goal is new
compared with the Soviet survival mechanism).
Foreign and security policies have to pursue contradictory paths. For the outside, these policies have
to create the image of Russia as a modern and respon-
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sible European state. For the inside, foreign policy has
to supply constant justification for the “Besieged Fortress” mentality and secure rejection of the Western
standards by the Russian society. This “driving two
horses in opposite directions” is actually the agenda
of Russian foreign and security policies that the Kremlin has been pursing with great skill during the last 10
years. This agenda is instrumental for reproduction of
the centralized state and personalized power that cannot exist without an alien environment. One thing has
to be added: foreign and security policy reproduces
fears, phobias, and complexes dominant in the Russian
domestic policy, which transfers into the realm of Russia’s relations with other states: suspicion, arrogance,
attempts to demonstrate might and at the same time
the Kremlin’s lack of vision and ability to forecast the
consequences of its actions. One could risk the conclusion that the Kremlin foreign and security policies are
more influenced by domestic needs than by the logic
of international relations. This is what makes Russia
such a difficult partner, forcing other states to view
Russian international behavior through the prism of
the Russian domestic trajectory. This creates puzzling
situations when, from all points of view, Russia acts
against common reason, ruining its own reputation as
it is doing, for instance, in its relations with Georgia,
recognizing the occupied territories as independent
states. But these actions could be easily predicted and
explained if one will look at the needs of the Russian
system and its personalized power.
Over the last 20 years, the Russian elite has developed a foreign policy model that one could define as
“together with the West (and even within the West)
and against the West at the same time.”2 Depending
on the circumstances at home and abroad, the Russian
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authorities shift the emphasis between different aspects of this contradictory model. But no matter what
line the Kremlin takes with regard to the West, its main
domestic goal remains unchanged: to structure the
Russian society on the basis of principles alien to the
West. The authorities can tone down this anti-Western
inclination during periods of dialogue and cooperation, but will never give up encouraging anti-Western
attitudes among the Russian public, continuing to
pursue “the Besieged Fortress” paradigm. In analyzing Russia’s foreign policy, one should not forget at
the same time that this is the policy of the Kremlin,
and the country’s ruling elite is not representative of
Russia as a country. Russian society comprises a wide
range of groups, and large sections of the public do
not necessarily share the authorities’ views on various
foreign policy and security issues.
The Kremlin’s foreign and security policy has
gone through phases corresponding to the stages in
the formation of the Russian political system. During the first phase (1991–93), when the Yeltsin team
had not yet renounced its highly amorphous democratic aspirations, the Kremlin tried to set Russia on
a course of integration with the West. The policy was
too contradictory and vague, however, as even during
this time Russia’s elite, including the liberals, still held
on to great-power ambitions and the Soviet behavior
model. In fact, during this stage the Kremlin tried to
integrate Russia into the West on its own terms.
In a second phase (1993–99), Russia was engaged in
dialogue with the West, but at the same time one could
see that the Russian elite returned to its usual suspicion with respect to the West. Moreover, the Kremlin started to use elements of containment trying to
prevent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
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enlargement. The Russian system had already taken
on its main outlines by this time, with power based
around a single leader who relied on a corrupted oligarchy for support. This regime saw elements of the
great-power mentality return to the fore.
In a third phase (2000–04), Putin made attempts
to establish a partnership with the West based on Realpolitik, hoping to become an equal member of the
Western club while retaining the monopolist power
system in Russia and holding on to its neo-imperial
aspirations. James Sherr rightly pointed out that there
was in this “a strong geo-economic emphasis.”3 In Putin’s view, this geo-economic leaning had to become
the new basis for returning to the first echelon of the
global actors. Although Putin’s version of Realpolitik
found support in the West, the Kremlin was unhappy
with the results in the end. Putin did not see signs
that his Western partners were ready to treat him as
an equal and endorse partnership with Russia on the
Kremlin’s conditions.
In 2004-08, a new fourth stage in Russia’s foreign
policy development began. The Orange revolution in
Ukraine was a watershed that pushed the Kremlin
into taking a more aggressive line in its relations with
the West. I doubt that Putin actually believed that
Western countries planned and organized Ukraine’s
upheavals. Rather, Moscow used the events in Kiev
as a justification for its increasing dissatisfaction with
the West, this on the back of a burst of self-confidence
brought on by rising oil prices and Putin’s growing
domestic popularity. The Russian elite had the sense
at that moment of a “Russia risen from its knees,” and
a large part of the public shared this view. Putin’s team
concluded that the time had come when Russia held
the upper hand and could dictate its rules to the West.
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Dmitry Trenin described the Kremlin’s new course
as an “imposed partnership” and defined the conditions Putin laid before the West: “Take us as we are
and do not meddle in our internal affairs; accept us
as your equals; in areas where our interests meet only
compromise solutions can be considered. We will
make concessions only if you do too.”4 I would add a
few more conditions to this list: respect Russia’s right
to a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area, conclude with Russia energy-security agreements that
would guarantee it long-term contracts for energy
supplies and ensure favorable conditions for Russian
business in Western markets.
Putin�������������������������������������������
������������������������������������������
not���������������������������������������
��������������������������������������
only����������������������������������
���������������������������������
formed Russia��������������������
’�������������������
s������������������
�����������������
new��������������
�������������
foreign������
�����
policy doctrine but also succeeded in turning it into the
main factor in consolidating the Russian society. He
definitely felt that foreign policy could be used more
aggressively to pursue a domestic agenda. �����������
On���������
the�����
��������
out����
side, Putin’s doctrine looked like a very contradictory
cocktail. Its main theses, set out on various occasions
by Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov, can be summed
up�������������������������������������������������������
as����������������������������������������������������
������������������������������������������������������
follows��������������������������������������������
���������������������������������������������������
: the���������������������������������������
������������������������������������������
existing������������������������������
��������������������������������������
system�����������������������
�����������������������������
of��������������������
����������������������
international������
�������������������
rela�����
tions is outdated, Russia proposes establishing a new
tripartite world government together with the United
States and the European Union (EU) that can steer the
global boat forward, and Russia calls for “networking
diplomacy” and a renunciation of old alliances (above
all, NATO).
In return, Moscow was ready to take into account
Western business interests in Russia. In February
2007, Putin delivered his famous Munich, Germany,
speech that was an attempt to force the West to accept
the new role of Russia and its terms of partnership.
Putin declared that “the world has reached a decisive
moment when we need to give serious thought to the
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entire global security structure.” This speech was an
ultimatum that made clear Russia’s willingness to risk
worsening relations with the West if it refused to accept the Kremlin package, i.e., its proposal to revise
the rules of the game established after 1991.
This rhetoric made it clear that by 2007 Russia had
become a revisionist power. Moscow demanded a return to some aspects of the bipolar world that existed
before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In essence, this
was a demand to recognize Russia’s right to a new format of neo-imperialist policy. No, this is not imperialism any more. This is a “post-imperialist syndrome,”
some would say. I would argue that if the goals of
this policy are to influence domestic developments in
neighboring countries using not only soft power but
tough pressure, this is definitely a variation of imperialism. But at the same time, Moscow tried to avoid
the confrontation that characterized the Cold War era.
Before 2004, the Kremlin was satisfied with the
role of enabler and spoiler. From 2004, Putin’s team
wanted more leverage. In his analysis of the Chinese
domestic and foreign policy, Bobo Lo wrote that China has been trying to assert its status as a global player
while “absolving it(self) of leadership responsibilities,” which means that China wants “to sit in the front
of the car, but doesn’t want to drive.”5 Putin’s team
offered a much more ambitious agenda for Russia:
they wanted it to be part of the global leadership and
wanted to “drive the car.” True, the Kremlin planned
to drive the car together with the United States and
the EU (though, the Russian team never took the EU
seriously).
Most Russian politicians and experts at the time
based�����������������������������������������������
the
����������������������������������������������
Russian foreign policy revisionism on geopolitical arguments—Russia’s growing power, West-
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ern weakness, the need to ensure respect of Russia’s
national interests, and the desire to make up for past
humiliations. But there was also the position set out by
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who declared that the
domination of Anglo-Saxon values was over and that
an era of competition in the “civilization dimension”
has begun. Not so long ago, members of the Russian
elite had been talking about how they accepted liberal
principles but applied them in accordance with Russia’s specific conditions. During Putin’s second presidency, they started to lay claim to their own value system, though it remained unclear exactly what values
they had in mind.
One could conclude at that time that the Kremlin
wanted to establish Russia’s status in a space somewhere between the West and the rest of the world, one
that would give it the chance to play by its own rules,
which were not always clear and certain. One fact,
though, was apparent: the Kremlin’s ambition was to
have an independent system with satellites in Russia’s
orbit. At the same time, Moscow wanted to be part of
Western decisionmaking mechanisms without making any commitments to the West.
Putin’s team wanted to ensure themselves a place
in the global governance with the West. This implied
a proposal to the West to return to a balance of power,
but with a Western guarantee that it would hold itself back with regard to Russia while recognizing the
country’s right to have its sphere of influence. The
Western leaders were hardly prepared for this unusual paradigm. This macho foreign policy model became
a powerful factor in Russian domestic affairs that had
to legitimize
�����������������������������������������������������
the Kremlin’s political regime. In the absence of ideology and an attractive domestic agenda,
the foreign policy doctrine had to ensure the interests
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of the Russian rentier class, the raw-materials model
of capitalism, and an authoritarian government. One
could hardly fail to notice an interesting phenomenon:
While seeking to maintain the status quo inside Russia and keep the ruling team in power, the Kremlin
was attempting to revise the status quo that emerged
in the world after the Soviet collapse. Being���������
a�������
��������
dogma������
tist and a revisionist at the same time has become the
Kremlin’s credo. Taking a look at the Russian elite’s
rhetoric in 2006–07, one could see statements such
as “Russia cannot take any one side in the conflict of
civilizations. Russia is ready to act as a bridge.” The
Kremlin�������������������������������������������
’������������������������������������������
s�����������������������������������������
����������������������������������������
choice����������������������������������
���������������������������������
of�������������������������������
������������������������������
words—mediator����������������
, ��������������
bridge��������
, ������
superpower��������������������������������������������
, ������������������������������������������
network�����������������������������������
����������������������������������
diplomacy,������������������������
�����������������������
and��������������������
�������������������
geopolitical�������
������
triangle—illustrated the reigning mood among the Russian
ruling team at the time.
The Kremlin’s offensive worked. The Russian elite
succeeded in forming a fairly broad range of instruments of influence in the West that continues to work
today. It includes co-opting Western business and
intellectual representatives into their own network,
playing on the contradictions between Western countries, imitating the West and making use of Western
double standards to justify Russian double standards.
This has become a clear model of a ruling class that
wants to have all the benefits the Western world can
offer but at the same time rejects its standards. Moscow could defend Serbia’s territorial integrity but at
the same time undermine Georgia’s and threaten to
split Ukraine. Russia could take part in the Russia–
NATO Council but at the same time consider NATO
its enemy. Meanwhile, Western leaders have failed to
offer an antidote to the Kremlin’s game.
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ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THE SYSTEM AND
ITS FOREIGN POLICY SUPPORT
The global economic crisis in 2008 forced Putin’s
team to tone down its ambitions and ushered in a new
phase in the Kremlin’s foreign and security policy development. The authorities realized that the domestic status quo was fragile and the economy in need of
modernization. This required a change of tactics, and
they therefore laid aside for the time being attempts
to blackmail and intimidate the West. They concluded
that what Russia needed to do was to make use of
financial and technological opportunities offered by
the West to overcome its backwardness, following a
formula that was used successfully on two previous
occasions in Russian history—by Peter the Great and
Joseph Stalin. The Kremlin decided to attempt for the
third time to use the West in bringing about post-industrial modernization while not changing the system
itself, i.e., without expanding freedom and competition.
The “reset” in Russian–U.S. and Russian–EU relations provided the authorities with the ideal tool for
carrying out their plans. Medvedev’s arrival in the
Kremlin gave this new model of relations a political
basis. The cooling in ties during Putin’s presidency
had come to an end and the mood in the West was
generally hopeful and looking to Medvedev’s supposedly pro-Western aspirations and liberal views.
Henry Kissinger wrote enthusiastically that “we are
witnessing one of the most promising periods in
Russian history.”6
It soon became clear, however, that hopes that
Medvedev would become the architect of a new breakthrough with the West were greatly exaggerated.
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Those who hoped that new president could set in motion a pro-Western shift in the Kremlin were failing to
see the obvious.
During the war against Georgia in 2008, Medvedev
sounded more hard-line in his anti-American and antiGeorgian declarations than Putin, the senior Russian
leader. Medvedev put forward five principles for Russia’s foreign policy, among which was Russia’s right
to take action beyond its borders to protect the lives
and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be,
and to pay special attention to specific regions where
Russia has “privileged interests.” This clearly showed
a desire to re-establish the historic buffer zone around
Russia and proved that Medvedev has been working
within the same foreign policy model as Putin. It was
after Medvedev’s arrival in the Kremlin that Russia
began threatening to take measures in response to
American missile defense plans in Europe, in particular by deploying Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad
Region. It was also under Medvedev that the latest gas
war between Russia and Ukraine flared up at the start
of 2009. Medvedev threatened Ukraine’s President
Viktor Yushchenko. For
�������������������������������
all the economic contradictions between the two sides and Kiev’s ambiguous
position, there was no doubt that Moscow’s tough approach to the dispute pursued the political objective of
destabilizing the situation in Ukraine and influencing
the political struggle for power in that country and at
the same time discrediting Ukraine in the West’s eyes
and thus blocking its road to Europe.
Medvedev’s��������������������������������������
idea of �����������������������������
a����������������������������
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binding����������������
���������������
treaty on European security and his explanation of his understanding
of this security arrangement has been the continuation
of an approach typical of Putin. It was not hard to see
the Kremlin’s intent—to prevent NATO expansion,
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put the Alliance outside the European security system,
and at the same time draw the European countries
into long years of senseless negotiations with Moscow
on the format of a new security agenda. True, quite
a few Western and Russian observers prefer not to
notice the Putin-Medvedev continuity in foreign and
security policy. They prefer to stress the “reset” signs.
Supporters of the reset have several arguments. They
point to the normalization of Russian–U.S. relations,
which is of course a positive step in itself.
Russia has normalized its relations with Poland,
too. Moscow decided not to torpedo United Nations
(UN) Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya, giving the Western allies the chance to try to stop Muammar Gadhafi’s war against his own people. I agree that
the efforts to overcome the tensions in Russia’s relations with the West and the Russian neighbors during
Medvedev’s presidency are positive. But the point I
want to get across is that this change in tone and even
in tactics does not reflect any fundamental transformation in Russia’s foreign policy doctrine and its domestic roots. Without such a change, we can view the
reset policy as simply a tactical move on the Kremlin’s
part. The new tactics have their cause: the Russian
authorities are trying to breathe new life into a disintegrating system that is inherently hostile to Western
civilization and to the interests of Russian society. The
reset simply turned out to be the most effective means
of achieving these objectives.
Moreover, Medvedev’s lack of real powers and his
never going outside the role of the “chair-warmer”
for Putin during his presidency only proved that his
foreign and security policy initiatives have been part
of Putin’s survival project. If one looks attentively at
Putin-Medvedev politics (I mean the real decisions
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and actions, not the rhetoric), one would see that the
Russian ruling group has been constantly moving in
various directions: to the right, to the left, forward, and
back. This fits the logic of a hybrid system made up of
opposing tendencies. The reset policy of the tandem
formula was an attempt to solve the problem of the
Russian economic modernization. But there are other
imperatives as well, first of all the need to preserve
monopoly on power. There is no other way to do it
without returning back to the usual trick—searching
for an enemy. Thus, at any moment the Kremlin can
push the button labeled “Cold Shower.”
CAN THE ‘RESET’ CHANGE THE RUSSIAN
SYSTEM?
Reflection on Russia’s foreign and security policy
brings a number of questions to the fore. One of them
asks whether foreign policy interests or internal political logic is the determinant factor? What led to the
strain in relations between Russia and the West during
NATO’s period of expansion and the Kosovo crisis,
for example? Most Russian observers would blame
the West’s policies, but I would say that the logic the
Russian system follows is to blame. If alienation from
Western civilization was not essential for keeping the
Russian power system in place, NATO’s eastward
expansion would not be perceived as a threat. On
the contrary, Russia would even seek to join the organization, perhaps, and the idea of NATO drawing
closer would not generate so many negative emotions.
Eastern European countries would perhaps not have
been so eager to rush into NATO’s embrace in the first
place, as they did in fear of an undemocratic Russia. If
the Russian authorities had changed their attitude to
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the value of human life and human rights, they would
not have tried to support Slobodan Milosevic, and the
Kosovo crisis would not have taken such a dramatic
turn. The reasons for the cooling in relations between
Russia and the West during this period thus lie, above
all, within Russia itself. It was the Russian system’s
internal logic that made foreign policy differences so
antagonistic. The same reasons explain the cooling of
the relationship in 2000-08—this was the work of the
Russian matrix.
Another question is, can the “reset” in Russia’s
relations with the United States and the EU lay the
foundation for a more solid and lasting partnership?
How should one assess the numerous initiatives that
seek to establish a new partnership model or at least
promote cooperation between Russia and the West? A
few of these initiatives are worth recalling. Igor Ivanov, Wolfgang Ischinger, and Sam Nunn, for example, proposed a “new approach” to resolving Europe’s
security issues and a “thorough reorganization of the
existing institutions, including the EU and NATO.”
This proposal is in the spirit of Medvedev’s initiative
to establish new European security organizations that
would weaken NATO. For their part, Igor Yurgens
and Oksana Antonenko proposed a new NATO-Russia Strategic Concept and pursuit of confidence building measures between the two sides. There have also
been the proposals that keep coming up to give Russia
membership in NATO. It is hard to object to measures
that would build greater confidence between the two
sides, but the question is, how realistically can they
be actually carried out if the principles and standards
the two sides pursue are fundamentally alien to each
other? Achieving real change in relations would require real change in the principles underpinning Rus-
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sia’s foreign policy, that is to say, real change to the
regime’s interests and nature.
Could external factors act as the impetus for such
change? During Mikhail Gorbachev’s time, the winding down of the Cold War certainly gave impetus to
internal liberalization in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). But let us not forget that Gorbachev
himself realized the need to end confrontation with
the West because he understood that this was harming
the Soviet Union and depriving it of sources of growth
and development. In short, internal considerations
were the primary factor in forming “the New Thinking” that emerged under Gorbachev. Today, too, Russia’s foreign policy will change only if the principles
that form the foundation of the Russian system also
change. Partial solutions such as cooperation between
Russia and the West on missile defense or addressing
the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs can
serve as the basis for nothing more than a temporary
warming in relations and pursuing tactical interests
together. They cannot produce lasting and stable cooperation.
This does not mean that tactical measures that
strengthen confidence between the two sides are not
needed. But to think that such measures will fundamentally change relations is an illusion, and it is precisely such illusions that help the Russian monopolist
power system to stay alive.
For now, things are clearly incompatible. Medvedev has been speaking of a successful reset (while Putin has been complaining that the reset did not bring
what Russia had anticipated), while at the same time
approving a new Military Doctrine (in February 2010)
that names as the main threats to Russia’s security
“NATO’s desire to extend the military organization of
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its member countries closer to Russia’s borders” and
“attempts [by Western countries] to destabilize the
situation in particular countries,” deployment of military contingents “on the territory of countries neighboring Russia” and “the creation of a missile defense
system.” In other words, containing the West is the
Military Doctrine’s main goal. Indeed, it sets the objective not just of containing the West, but of preparing for future wars in space. Wars with whom? With
the West, of course! “Air and space defense . . . is not
a deterrent instrument but a policy of preparing for a
major war against the main powers and alliances in
the world,” warned Alexei Arbatov, giving his assessment of the Military Doctrine’s primary objectives.7
The reset thus does not change the essence of the
Kremlin’s foreign policy paradigm. So long as the
Russian authorities still hope to use the West to support Russia’s modernization efforts, one can expect
the Kremlin to refrain from an aggressive line. In any
case, the Russian elite’s new means of survival through
integration at the personal level into the Western community neutralizes the threat of a new cold war. The
Russian elite is not devoid of common sense, after all,
and it realizes that Russia’s possibilities are limited;
it is clearly not about to take any suicidal steps. But
the Kremlin’s pragmatism did not prevent the sharp
cooling in Russia’s relations with its Western partners
in 2004–07. A number of internal factors force the Russian authorities to turn up the anti-Western rhetoric
again. First among these are the parliamentary and
presidential elections in 2011 and 2012. Russia’s elections are always accompanied by a dose of the rhetoric
of the “besieged fortress.” There is a new phenomenon to consider too, namely, the public’s growing discontent with the country’s leaders, including Putin. In
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this situation, and with social problems on the rise too,
the Kremlin’s anti-Western rhetoric will only increase.
Faced with dwindling possibilities for pepping up the
public, the Russian authorities always start looking
for an enemy, and the obvious candidate among Russia’s potential enemies is the United States, of course.
Surveys in January 2011 showed that 70 percent of
respondents think that Russia has enemies. This shows
that the mentality typical of the militarist paradigm
of state life endures. Who are these enemies today?
Chechen terrorists were named by 48 percent of respondents, while 40 percent named the United States,
32 percent said NATO, and 30 percent “some forces in
the West.” Despite the reset, 65 percent consider the
United States an aggressor that seeks to take control
of the entire world. The Soviet model of relations with
the United States, with the Kremlin’s help, thus continues to flourish today. The Kremlin’s anti-Western
rhetoric at home will inevitably spill over into its foreign and security policy, too.
FUTURE SCENARIOS: BETWEEN ATROPHY
AND IMPLOSION
Russia’s options are becoming more limited every
day because the system cannot compete with Western
society in innovation or ability to address global challenges. Meanwhile, the Russian elite cannot permit
even limited liberalization because that would threaten its monopoly on power and property. Political
pluralism and competitiveness would mean the end
of history in Russia, i.e., the end of the era of personalized power. The conservative part of the Russian ruling team may try to preserve the system by wielding
an iron hand and even more blatant anti-Western pos-

21

turing. The iron hand scenario will be more likely in
case the authorities start to lose control over the Russian developments. The more liberal part of the political class oriented toward dialogue with the West may
not support the repressive scenario (though this is not
certain). But could it consolidate its position so as to
prevent the emergence of a stronger form of authoritarianism or even neototalitarianism? The answer is
not clear. This is not a potential clash of ideologies or
even of political orientations, but a clash of different
ways of existence for the same rentier class. However,
even if the iron hand scenario prevails, it is unlikely
that the traditionalists will be able to hold on to power
for long. Russia does not have the prerequisites for
that, such as the willingness of the political class to
isolate the country completely, reliable power structures and the public’s willingness to turn Russia into
North Korea. But if the ruling team chooses that path,
Russia and possibly the outside world will pay a high
price. Moreover, the jury is out as to how and in what
shape Russia will exit from the iron hand scenario.
The more liberal segment of the Russian rentier
class and a new batch of systemic reformers could try
to preserve personalized power in a new form under
a liberal banner. However, soft authoritarianism that
undermines itself with empty liberal rhetoric will
hardly be sustainable either. It does not lead to the liberal opening. Quite the contrary: this would discredit
the liberal idea and pro-Western longings just like the
Yeltsin presidency did. In any case, Putin’s return to
the Kremlin makes the option of softer authoritarianism rather doubtful. Sooner or later, Putin will have to
turn to tougher measures to secure his hold on power.
Any open conflict within the Russian elite contains
the seeds of hope, however weak, for the transforma-
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tion of the traditional state. But a liberal breakthrough
is possible only if a responsible and anti-systemic
liberal opposition that will secure society’s support
emerges in Russia. Without that, a schism in the political class will lead to yet another mutation of the
same old autocracy or will trigger the unraveling of
the state. Despite growing resentment of the population and loss of credibility, Putin’s ruling team has all
the reasons to retain control over the country and secure the replication of its power beyond 2012. Such an
outcome would mean that Russia would be stuck in
growing stagnation for an indeterminate time. If oil
prices remain high, society continues to be passive,
business interests willingly serve the regime, the opposition stays fragmented, and the West supports the
Kremlin, then degradation and atrophy is the most
probable scenario for Russia at least in the next 5–7
years.
In a regime that is not prepared to impose mass
repressive measures but is also incapable of dialogue
with society, it does not matter who stands as the embodiment of political power. Nor does it matter what
rhetoric or governing style the regime employs. In
this scenario, economic growth in certain spheres is
possible, which will create the appearance of development. Economic growth during the Putin’s presidency
not only did not lead to the formation of a diversified
economic model, it did not halt the growth of the gap
between Russia and the developed world either. The
result will be continuing rot. This is the worst possible
scenario. It can continue for a long time and bring total degradation of the population. The nation will lose
steam and the desire to succeed. In some Russian regions, this degradation has already reached the point
of no return.
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Another scenario cannot be ruled out—that of a
new violent implosion in Russia. With the highly centralized system recreated by Putin, dysfunction in one
part can set off a chain reaction leading to a repeat of
1991. All such a chain reaction requires is an economic
crisis more serious than the one that befell Russia in
2008. Even without an economic crisis, the failure of
individual elements in the political system (for example, a disruption in the connection between the
center and the regions) could topple the first domino
and start total unraveling. Collapse of the system can
also result from a series of technological catastrophes
befalling Russia’s Soviet-era industrial infrastructure.
If you recall, the Chernobyl accident provided an incentive for Ukraine to leave the Soviet Union, making
its disintegration inevitable. But both scenarios—the
one of gradual rot and the one of fast implosion—will
bring the collapse of the state in the end.
The Russian public is suffering government failures silently for the time being. The reason is not due
to Russians’ world-renowned patience, but because
people do not see an alternative. But at some point
people will start looking to look for it.
Surveys demonstrate that the mood of the Russian population is definitely changing. In the spring
of 2011, about 84 percent of Russians said they saw
no opportunity to influence political process. The
majority of the population was not prepared to participate in politics, relied only on itself, and tried to
avoid any contact with official structures. This proves
that Russians have rid themselves of their traditional
paternalism. The system and society are now drifting
in opposite directions. So far, this fact has helped the
system to survive, but it is worth remembering that
the last time that happened, in 1991, the Soviet Union
collapsed.
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The fact that social anger and frustration are growing faster than the political process can channel it increases the danger of turmoil daily. At the moment,
the collapse scenario seems rather unlikely. But since
it is only possible to understand part of what is going
on, it is reasonable to keep that scenario on the table.
Using force to prolong a doomed system can only
hasten its end and have devastating consequences for
Russian statehood. Then again, any of the possible
scenarios, including the transformational one, carries
the threat of breakdown, due to the fact that Russia
contains national and territorial communities that are
civilizationally and culturally incompatible with each
other. The North Caucasus is one example.
Fear of territorial loss and statehood implosion is
a substantial obstacle to any political change. Even
Westernizing liberals shudder to think that liberalization could create a repeat of the events of 1991. But
it is worth noting that within Russian expert circles
the idea that the current system is not likely to be reformed, and even if it is reformed as the result of the
social and political protests, both options will lead to
a new statehood is being already widely discussed.
However, neither the Russian political class as a
whole nor the public is ready for that possibility. The
public, for the time being, will not support reform if
it believes that reform will lead to territorial loss or a
new state. But moods do change, and there may come
changes of public perceptions and anticipations. Thus,
it is important to deliberate now on what a new fragmentation of Russia would mean for the world. What
would be the reaction of neighboring countries such
as China and Turkey, or those in Central Asia and the
Islamic world?
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Decentralization of power in Russia is unlikely to
lead to Siberia and the Far East breaking away from
European Russia, but these regions will certainly seek
greater autonomy and a greater influence on foreign
policy. It is entirely possible these regions’ relations
with China, Japan, South and North Korea, and the
United States will become far more important in their
eyes than relations with European Russia. The future
of Russia’s nuclear facilities and industry is another
issue as far as future developments go, and could
become a problem every bit as serious as the Iranian
nuclear issue. Lax security and safety measures at
nuclear-waste storage sites in Russia already threaten
the lives of local people and in a situation of growing chaos and lack of control could become an even
greater danger.
The consequences of Russia’s existence as a civilizational hybrid imitating the West are already starting to make themselves felt now. Russia is not a direct
military threat to the West, and this lulls the West into
a false security with regard to Russia. A civilizational
hybrid of Russia’s type can have an indirect effect on
the prospects for liberal democracy in other countries.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky rightly warned that Russia
has become a big exporter not just of commodities,
but also of corruption. The Russian elite, having integrated at the personal level into Western society,
have already succeeded in turning some Western financial organizations into a money-laundering machine. There is now a unique situation in which the
Western elite tries to educate the Russian political
class about the principles of liberal democracy, while
this same political class turns these principles into an
imitation. This could become a real threat to Western
civilization itself.
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BUILD-UP OF SUSPENSE
The paradox—one of many—is that those factors
that helped to strengthen the Russian system have begun to undermine it. Take, for example, corruption,
which until quite recently was one of the pillars of the
Russian state. Today it has become a dreadful source
of weakness. Corrupt police and public officials provide little support for the ruling team. The corrupt
state apparatus disobeys orders from the center with
impunity. The regime understands the threat posed
by corruption, but taking decisive measures against it
would mean rejecting the principles on which the system is built. Or consider another factor: the elections
whose management the Kremlin has now mastered.
Until recently, manipulating elections and falsifying
their results helped to preserve continuity of power.
But falsification only works when the public agrees
to play “Let’s pretend!” The time may come when
the public says, “Enough! We don’t want to play that
game anymore!” That is exactly what the people of
Serbia and Ukraine did.
To achieve the results it wanted in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2011–12, the regime
had to falsify results on much greater scale than before.
That means that a regime based on blatantly rigged
elections will lose all pretense to legitimacy. The only
way it will be able to hold on to power is through applying more broadly the means of repression. But the
state is not ready for repression on a massive scale. No
matter how hard the political class tries to keep Russia drifting through the zone of uncertainty, sooner
or later it will have to acknowledge that the present
Pseudo-Project has exhausted itself. A state that satisfies narrow vested interests while pretending that it is
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satisfying national ones, and which has no resources
to shut society from the outside world is doomed, and
its use of imitation to survive only increases the danger of its inevitable collapse.
It is not clear how the traditionalists in the Russian elite would behave in a crisis. But the probability
is high that they will try to use foreign policy tools
in a power struggle. It is hard to tell what form that
might take: conflicts with neighbors, using foreign
“hot spots” to provoke tension, new “gas wars,” or
a new chill in the relationship with the West, and accusations that it is guilty of the Russian misfortunes.
What is important is that a system that replicates itself
by nursing its great-power ambitions, and which is
based on anti-Western sentiments, will not be able to
give either up easily.
In any case, the current “reset” should not make
either Russia or the outside world complacent. The
new warmth between the Russian state and the outside world can hardly be sustainable if the Russian
elite continues to view the West as a foe that has to be
deterred and the country’s neighbors as satellites who
belong to its sphere of influence. The honeymoon can
continue only if the Western powers accept the Russian way of dealing with the world.
Meanwhile, the time is approaching when the Russian regime will not be able to provide the standard of
living and consumerist lifestyle that the most dynamic
strata of Russian society have come to expect over the
past 20 years. The social base of the system, which has
kept things stable throughout the Putin–Medvedev
period, may be undermined at any moment. Revolutions take place when people have lost all hope in the
future and when improvement gives way to falling
living standards for the population. The relative open-
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ness of Russian society can contribute to undermining
stability: people will compare the situation in Europe
and Russia and see that the comparison is increasingly
not in Russia’s favor. One of the causes of discontent in
Ukraine in 2004 was the comparison Ukrainians made
between themselves and their increasingly prosperous Polish neighbors.
There are questions that will come up on the agenda very soon. One of them is what would be the personal fate of Russia’s leaders if upheaval were to begin
in the country? How would the world in general react
if the Russian people took to the streets and the Kremlin decided to use force to suppress them? The West
would do well to reflect on these issues ahead of time
and not end up wavering in its response, as during the
Arab revolutions. Should they put in place conditions
that would enable Russia’s leaders to depart peacefully, and guarantee them safety outside Russia? How to
avoid Russia following the Gadhafi or the Assad scenarios, in which a leader driven into a corner resorts to
civil war and bloodshed? These questions could come
up sooner than is commonly thought.
Attempts to build stable and constructive relations
between Russia and the West will either fail or produce imitation mechanisms in Russia so long as they
do not address the root links between the country’s
internal development and its behavior on the world
stage. Understanding these links will at least help to
predict possible zigzags in relations and to understand
Russian motivations. The West will eventually have
to come to the realization that the Russian system is
doomed and that the search for a new development
model in Russia is inevitable. This will be a difficult,
painful, and dramatic process. The West would be
able to facilitate this process somewhat if it at the very
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least refrains from any action that only serves to legitimize a doomed system.
HOW TO GET OUT OF THE TRAP
I have described a bleak picture. Ironically, Russia presents a more optimistic landscape when viewed
from outside. The domestic audience, including the
official establishment, on the contrary starts to view
Russia’s future as a catastrophe. What does Russia
need to do to break out of its vicious circle and take
on a European identity? Is there still a chance to do
this? Or has Russia reached the point of no return in
its stagnation slide?
In order to survive, Russia must reform its state
matrix. This presumes a solution to the triad problem:
a transition to the principle of competition in economics and politics, a rejection of the principle of merging power and property, and strengthening the rule
of law. In practice, these three issues mean a transition to political struggle, and the inevitable end of the
ruling regime and its focus on continuity and control
of property. Solving the triad problem is impossible
without a review of the Putin–Medvedev foreign policy doctrine, which justifies simultaneous cooperation
and containment of the West. To undergo such a radical transformation, the Russian elite must first realize
that the current model of Russia’s development is exhausted.
Today the Kremlin’s modernization mantra
proves that the ruling elite is not ready to start a real
de-hermetization (liberalization). This leads to the
unpleasant conclusion that a crisis—whether social,
economic, or political—is needed to persuade the elite
that the system is threatening its survival. Regretfully,
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there are no examples in Russian history of preventive reform before a crisis hits. For the time being, the
current ruling team has mistaken the lack of massive
social unrest and anger as a license to continue moving in the same direction indefinitely. “We’ll think of
something tomorrow,” the denizens of the Kremlin
tell themselves, but the longer they take, the greater
the danger of their losing control of the situation.
There is one more factor that may be just as important for Russia’s transformation. No liberal transformation has ever taken place without the country
in question coming into the orbit of the West. Since
World War II, the key factor in transitions to democracy has been external pressure. This was what facilitated the democratic development of Germany and
later of Southern European countries. Accession to the
EU and NATO was the guarantee of irreversible transformation for the European post-Communist states.
But openness to outside influence means readiness on
the part of a country to limit its own sovereignty. Today Russia finds itself in a situation where Europe is
not prepared to integrate it, and it is not prepared to
give up even part of its sovereignty. On the contrary,
retaining sovereignty has become the elite’s most important tool for retaining power. Even Russian Westernizing liberals do not dare to mention that the country might have to give up a portion of its sovereignty
to supranational European structures. For the man in
the street, the very idea is blasphemous, a betrayal of
the Homeland. Russian leaders see their primary mission as strengthening Russia’s sovereignty and maintaining its independent path. How different they are
from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who led Germany
to democracy, when he dared to declare in 1953 that
“Europe is more important than a nation!”
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“Nothing to worry about,” say some liberal observers in Russia, “we can make Russia a modern state
while taking an independent path and subordinating
ourselves to no one.” Alas, there is no precedent for
liberal transformation without the influence of the
West and some type of integration with the West, and
Russian development after 1991 gives no indication
that that precedent is about to be broken. Meanwhile,
the logic of history moves on. In its day, the Soviet
Union based its existence on a global missionary project. That project was bound for nowhere, but at least it
conferred an idea and passion to the system. Today’s
Russian system has two ideas: national egotism and
personal enrichment. But people are beginning to ask:
“Is our might a delusion? And who is going to make
us rich, and how?” The Russian authorities do not
have the answers.
The mood is already changing. About a third of
Russians could now be considered to form the modernist part of society—people who are psychologically prepared to live and work in a liberal system.
The modernist part of Russian society and the passive
strata that could join it would comprise about 68 percent of the population. Today about 53 percent of poll
respondents believe that it is most important to “respect civil, political, religious, and other rights” and
only 27 percent think that the most important action is
“subordination of the minority to majority.” About 50
percent think that Russia has to join the EU, and only
27 percent think that it should not. At the moment,
these people are atomized and are just hoping to get by
on their own. It is not clear who or what could awaken
them, or what will happen when they do awaken. But
an enormous part of the Russian public is ready to accept new ways of doing things. This fact may become
the key to Russia’s future.
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However, the Russian elite do not show signs that
they are able to comprehend that continuing on the
present path is suicidal. In the past, Russia has always
sought its truth at the bottom of the abyss. In order
to keep from falling into the abyss yet again, society
must pressure the elite to take stock of its situation.
For now, the public seems to be content with playing the regime’s games. Those members of the elite
who understand their plight remain too enmeshed in
the system to speak out. For the time being, no one
is taking responsibility for Russia’s future. People
who are able and willing to do so appear, however,
when there is a societal demand for them. The liberalization of the Gorbachev era arose spontaneously,
bringing to the fore previously unknown figures who
grasped the historical moment better than anyone else
(although they were not ready to offer a constructive
alternative).
For now, the attempt to modernize Russia without
changing the rules of the game may be the last Russian illusion. It is, in any case, an illusion that few in
Russia seem inclined to believe. Even the Kremlin spin
doctors have not bothered trying to make it sound
convincing. The country’s leaders are obviously confused, and it is clear that they do not know where they
are leading it. The elite is trying to guess at what is
ahead, while safely squirreling away their families
and finances in the West—just in case. The political regime cannot halt the growing dissatisfaction in
its ranks.
What are the steps that could guarantee that this
time Russia is ready to dismantle the Russian matrix? Let me give the “Must Do” agenda. Russia will
need to:
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•	Hold free elections of the National Convention
that will endorse the new constitution that will
eliminate the omnipotence of the leader and introduce the checks and balances mechanism;
•	Endorse new elections laws and guarantee free
registration of the parties;
•	Hold free elections to the legislatures and local
self-government bodies and form a new government responsible to the Parliament;
• Secure freedom of media and meetings; and,
•	Disband the current courts and law enforcement bodies (using the Georgian example) and
form new ones.
These will be the first steps that could help Russia
to get rid of the old system and start with new rules
of the game. This transformation cannot be successful without massive pressure from the society, and the
transformation itself cannot be done by the current
ruling elite. All attempts to change the system just by
new elections and bringing “new blood” into the state
structures without changing the hyper-presidential
constitution will be doomed to become a new Potemkin village exercise.
The true Russian transformation will be the result
of domestic developments, activity, and actors. But
this transformation has no future without incentives
from the outside. The West and its readiness to create
a constructive external environment for the Russian
transformation could become a serious, if not crucial,
factor of change. In order to play this role, the collective West will have to be able to avoid the confusion
in which it found itself many times before, i.e., being
caught flat-footed by the rush of history. In 1991, Western leaders and experts did not foresee the collapse of
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the USSR—a comment on the quality of their Sovietology. In 1995–96, the West failed to appreciate the character of the system founded by Yeltsin. In 1999–2008,
many Western politicians were mesmerized by the
“Russian miracle,” failing to understand the substance
of the Putin regime and the kind of economic stability
he created. In time, the number of inveterate optimists
was reduced. But there are still quite a few who hail
the idea of Kremlin modernization from the top with
enthusiasm. These optimists are matched by others
who reject the possibility of Russia’s ever becoming
a normal liberal country that maintains friendly relations with the West. Hopefully, today the West will be
more prepared for a new stage of development.
One should not be lulled by the fact that things
in Russia are quiet for now. This is a deceptive quiet.
Even if a significant part of the public and a not-so-insignificant part of the elite believe they are living in a
temporary shelter that needs to be rebuilt, that in itself
is a condemnation of the system and of the Russian
state. The Russian elite can keep engaging with Western counterparts, and Russian society may look as if
it continues to sleep (or pretends to sleep), but deep
down society is stirring. The new Russian “moment of
truth” is inevitable. Regretfully, it will have to come
after Russia and the West overcome the new illusion
that Russia can modernize itself without changing its
old genetic code.
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CHAPTER 2
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC REFORM:
WAITING FOR GODOT
Steven Rosefielde
INTRODUCTION
Policymakers have long been double-minded
about Russian economic possibilities. During the cold
war, some imagined that the Soviet Union could improve planning sufficiently to overtake or even surpass America. Others felt that while planning was
intrinsically inferior, the Kremlin could always set
things right by jettisoning command and transitioning
to democratic free enterprise.
Post-communism has taught them little.1 They fail
to appreciate that the Soviet Union’s flaws went deeper than command and that neither “liberalization” nor
global market participation are panaceas.2 Russia’s
core Muscovite economic system was inferior for 4
centuries before Joseph Stalin vainly tried to subdue
rent-seeking New Economic Policy (NEP) commissars
and red directors with “scientific” planning. Postcommunist leaders have not fared any better in taming
the beast. Policymakers across the globe consequently
continue to await Godot (God),3 expecting Moscow to
adequately reform itself without recognizing that this
is ”impossible” in Kenneth Arrow’s rigorous sense.4
Arrow demonstrated mathematically that it was
impossible to reform balloting procedures sufficiently
to make the democratic provision of public goods and
services as efficient as private sector supply because
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elections do not tell officials what the majority wants
program by program.5 They only reveal favorite candidates. Electoral rules of course can be reformed, but
this is subsidiary. What matters is the impossibility of
any reform to make majority (or principals’) preferences comprehensively determinative. People held
different views on the matter before 1953. After Arrow proved his theorem, the “possibility” issue was
closed. The only question left on the table was democracy’s adequacy.
Analogously, it can be proven that Russia’s rentgranting economic system cannot be made comprehensively responsive to the Kremlin’s, or the nation’s
preferences, and that the disconnect between demand
and efficient supply (including innovation) is far larger than those of its western rivals. Consequently, if
Kremlin supply preferences, including keeping pace
with its neighbors, is the success criterion, then Russia’s economy must disappoint, leaving no alternative but to accept significant inferiority, or switch by
transitioning to the market. Moscow must choose to
accept the limitations of reform within its system; or
transition by replacing its current system with a better one. There is no middle way that allows Russian
living standards to converge toward the west’s high
frontier, and simultaneously preserve its reliance on
rent-granting and rent-seeking (See Figure 2-1).

38

Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics,
Geneva, Switzerland: Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development OECD, 2003, available from www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_03-2009xls. West Europe
includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Gross domestic product (GDP) for West Europe and
Russia is calculated in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars.

Figure 2-1. USSR-EU Territorial per capita GDP:
Comparative Size 1500-2006
(West European Benchmark).
Russia can reconfigure its economic institutions,6
but the Kremlin cannot make them work satisfactorily because principal-agent mechanisms capable of
achieving competitively efficient rent-granting do not
exist.7 Russian economic reform in this critical sense is
“impossible,”8 despite eternal debates about “change”
amid “continuity.”9 In the Arrow case, one can imagine rival democracies performing similarly, but the
Kremlin’s plight is harsher because Muscovite rentgranting is intrinsically inferior to competitive free
enterprise.
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One might suppose accordingly, that once the
impossibility of adequate Muscovite reform is recognized, Kremlin leaders will immediately junk their
rent-granting style of economic governance and transition to democratic free enterprise, but this is unlikely. Russia’s tsars, commissars, and presidents prefer
delegating micro-governance authority to vassals in
return for service, tribute, taxes, and political support.
They are attracted to command, and would welcome
market discipline, but steadfastly refuse to relinquish
their sovereign-vassal style of rule because, on balance, Kremlin leaders believe Muscovite rent-granting and rent-seeking provide them with the highest
personal well-being.
This chapter elaborates the evolution of the Russia’s Muscovite economic governance regime (sometimes called patrimonial bureaucracy),10 and then
describes an impossibility theorem proving that there
is no intra-systemic reform (rent-granting, command,
and incomplete markets)11 that can make Russia’s
economy sustainably competitive with its rivals.12
Moscow could switch systems (transition), but is most
likely to continue waiting for Godot.
CORE MUSCOVITE MODEL
Russia has been reforming its core Muscovite
economy created by Ivan the Great in the late 15th
century for at least 300 years. The pure model was
a unitary state economic governance scheme where
Tsars, (principals) unable to micro-plan and command
production throughout their vast domains, chose to
lease their freehold property on a revocable basis to
vassals (agents) in return for crop shares, tax collection, and imperial service. Servitors were given a free
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hand to manage these tenuous grants, subcontracting
to overseers down a chain of command that ended
with task masters flogging serf-slaves. There was no
place in this primitive extraction system for multiple
goals and competitive compensation. Tsars, servitors,
and subcontractors merely sought to get what they
could from the weak (satisficing),13 leaving the serfslaves with bare subsistence, and dividing the booty
arbitrarily among themselves.
TSARIST STATE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
REFORM
The core model served its purpose and was deemed
adequate until Peter the Great decided that state munitions and luxury good suppliers to the court had to
meet quantitative and qualitative standards. Primitive
rent-granting and service repayment suddenly was
insufficient. State economic governance now required
professional management for acquiring appropriate
technologies, assuring quality control and large-scale
production. The reform left unitary nonmarket state
governance intact, and was a far cry from Stalin’s concept of comprehensive economic command, but nonetheless should be seen as a baby step toward communist central planning.
ECONOMIC CO-GOVERNANCE
The 18th century witnessed a counter trend. The
scope of state economic management continued to
increase at a snail’s pace, however, it gradually was
supplemented with emerging agrarian and industrial
markets. Marketization accelerated during the 19th
century, assisted by the abolition of serfdom and an
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influx of western foreign direct investment (FDI).14
These forces radically altered the core Muscovite model by transforming it from a unitary to an economic
co-governance regime (rent-granting extraction, embryonic command, and market). Serf-slavery limited
the market’s salutary impact on productivity, but
opened up the possibility of Soviet NEP-style reform,
or as many 19th and 20th century observers preferred
to believe, a transition to democratic free enterprise.
Vladimir Lenin feared that prospect.15 The economist
Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky documented the transformation,16 and Anders Aslund prematurely declared
capitalism’s triumph in 1997.17
SOVIET MUSCOVITE REFORM
Economic co-governance was junked 1917-21 during War Communism in favor of requisitioning and
rationing (unitary state economic governance).18 Lenin
declared that his (and Friedrich Engels’s) “post office”
scheme for ordering, producing, and delivering goods
in lieu of markets would be systems-changing, replacing capitalism (Muscovy) with socialism (command
control), but the initiative failed.19 Muscovite economic co-governance (rent-granting, command, and
markets) was restored during NEP 1921-29 (including state leasing).20 This market communist experiment soon fell victim to Stalin’s political intrigues. He
scrapped NEP economic co-governance in September
1929, reverting to Ivan Grozny’s and Peter the Great’s
rent-granting/command model, “improving” it with
central planning, material incentives, terror, and Gulag forced labor.21 Stalin’s unitary state communist
Muscovite reform regime was periodically tweaked.
Nikita Khrushchev, fearing Stalin’s ghost, dispensed
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with terror. In the 1960s, he promoted the Liberman
profit-seeking enterprise reform22 and decentralized and downsized the Gulag.23 Alexei Kosygin followed in his footsteps,24 but rent-granting command
(agent management, weakly guided by Tekhpromfinplany [technical-industrial-financial plans]) reigned
throughout,25 until Mikhail Gorbachev’s partial reintroduction of cooperative leasing (Arenda) in 1987.26
Gorbachev’s blending of leasing markets, and
command (Perestroika) marks the beginning of the latest economic co-governance episode distinguished by
the Kremlin’s remarkable indulgence of servitors empowered to extract state resources and capture anticompetitive market opportunities.27 Some competitive
market elements have been beneficially introduced,
including partial integration into the global economy,
but remain subsidiary in the grand new scheme. Boris
Yeltsin’s version of Russia’s latest Muscovite economic co-governance regime devised by Stanislav Shatalin
and Grigory Yavlinsky, Perekhod (transition), has been
heralded as a clean break with extraction and rentgranting. It is supposed to have launched a 500-day
transition from communist Muscovite command to
democratic free enterprise.28 The claim, if sincere, however was wishful thinking.29 Yeltsin and his chosen
Russian secret police (FSB) successor, Vladimir Putin,
modernized Muscovite economic co-governance, but
the core system remains intact with little prospect of
authentic transition.30 The reintroduction of Russian
style co-governing markets is not enough, nor has it
ever been sufficient to create a competitive model that
can keep pace with Moscow’s rivals. This does not
mean that Russia’s economic co-governance system
cannot be improved, but it does mean that we should
temper expectations, if as seems likely the Kremlin
chooses to cling to its tried and defective ways.
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A COMPETITIVE SECOND BEST
What are the prospects for Putin discovering a
lasting Muscovite second best co-governance model
that will allow Russia to keep pace with, or outstrip
its rivals? Although hope springs eternal in the Kremlin, Alexander Gerschenkron’s studies suggest that
it cannot be done. His research shows that economic
reforms in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries allowed
Russia to develop in fits and starts (reforms sometimes
had fleeting beneficial effect), but no Muscovite governance regime ever enabled it to sustainably challenge
the west.31 Figures 2-1 and 2-2 illustrate the dilemma.
They show that Russian per capita GDP steadily declined for more than a half millennium relative to the
European Union (EU) norm. It fared worse in comparison with America. There have been a few fleeting moments of catch up, but no sustained reversal of
fortune.32

Source: Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics.

Figure 2-2. Russian-EU Per Capita GDP:
Comparative Size 1820-2006
(West European Benchmark).
44

IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
The fatal flaw in Muscovite economic governance
is the conviction that anticompetitive privilege granting will not degrade economic efficiency enough to
matter; that satisficing (making do) will not keep Russia permanently behind the competition.33
Kremlin leaders want to have their cake and eat it
too. They prefer to lease or sell their rights as “principal” to economically govern, yet still retain firm control over agent behavior and outcomes. They know
with certainty that agents will be tempted to subordinate duty to personal interest because of asymmetric
information and principals’ need to curry agents’ favor, but expect everything to work out well enough.
This principal-agent problem can be formally expressed as a trilemma,34 where 1) the crown can delegate broad “extractive” authority (Muscovite rentgranting), supplemented with weak edicts (ukazy);
2) it can construct a strong plan-command control
regime accepting the deficiencies of central planning
and morally hazardous compliance schemes; and, 3)
it can install competitive, market-disciplined co-governance.35
Tsars, commissars, and presidents must choose
one, and only one primary option as a basic style of
rule, even though rent-granting can be partly combined with command and markets. They cannot empower servitors, and simultaneously subordinate
them to command, or allow them to competitively
vie with markets without negating “oligarch-agent”
autonomy. They cannot comprehensively plan, and
simultaneously rent-grant, or permit markets to countermand plan directives without undermining plan
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compliance.36 They cannot make markets supreme
and simultaneously rent-grant and command without
compromising the benefits of competition.
The market option is synonymous with transition
and has been steadfastly resisted for more than 500
years. Post-Soviet leaders have rejected command
planning. Thus, Putin and his successors find themselves stuck with rent-granting, haphazardly mitigated with aspects of plans and markets, just as Tsar
Nicholas II did before them. The possibility of economic reform enabling Russia to parry its rivals therefore
depends on the existence of a potent principal-agent
mechanism; one capable of optimally integrating rentseeking, command, and markets.37 It must reconcile
the intrinsic contradictions among delegation, command, and competitive market discipline.
There is a vast technical economic literature on
the difficulty of holding wily servitors accountable
under a wide range of circumstances given asymmetric information, but none showing how agents can be
compelled to comply with unstated objectives that
principals do not bother formulating, when rulers are
inclined to forgive most peccadilloes in an institutional setting that rejects effective market discipline. These
lacunae are telltale signs. Russia’s tsars, commissars,
and presidents insist on satisficing,38 and reject subordinating their authority to competitive markets. They
would gladly command, but with the Soviet experience in mind shun it, even in the military industrial
complex (VPK). The principal consequently cannot
devise an incentive scheme to discipline agents, and
could not apply one if it existed because rulers insist
on satisficing. Muscovite rent-granting as a free standing system cannot pass the principal-agent coherency test when rulers want vassals to fulfill unstated
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desires. Nor can the crown allow markets to do the
job without infringing on Kremlin sovereignty. The
impossibility of formulating and designing coherent
principal-agent incentive mechanisms to reconcile the
contradictions of mixed Muscovite economic control,
proves the impossibility of systems empowering Russian economic reform under prevailing circumstances. There is nothing that the Kremlin can do that will
allow it to overtake the west, keep pace, or surpass
it thereafter under a Muscovite unitary or co-governance system.
Russia’s GDP can grow, and the living standard
gap can be narrowed through modernization and
technology transfer,39 but Russia will remain forever
at the back of the pack as long as Muscovite rentgranting is in command. It may flourish from time to
time through divine coincidence,40 but even then it will
not take long for servitors to undo any good that that
might be done. This judgment is not abstruse. It is eminently practical. There are classes of principal-agent
problems that can be solved, or at least adequately
managed, but Muscovite regimes do not qualify because rulers do not have operational objective functions, collude with their servitors, and condone their
mischief.
GUNS AND BUTTER
Nonetheless, Gerschenkron has demonstrated that
while Muscovite rulers cannot reform their way to
competitive success, they can try to compensate by
emphasizing the production of guns or butter. Putin
appreciates the possibilities, and for the moment has
implicitly chosen butter over guns, tolerating low
volumes of weapons production despite the govern-
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ment’s ambitious weapons production plans.41 These
policies may have limited benefits, and can be construed as economic reforms in a narrow sense, but
cannot in and of themselves change the dismal fundamentals.
PROSPECTS
The likelihood of Russia’s economy becoming sustainably competitive with its main rivals by reforming its Muscovite co-governance mechanism is nil,
despite misleading statements implying that Russian
per capital GDP dectupled 1999-2011.42 Russia’s living standard increased 64 percent 1999-2006 according to Angus Maddison’s OECD calculations, and is
unchanged point to point 2006 through 2011. Its per
capita GDP today is the same as it was in 1989,43 after
2 decades of hyper-depression ( a depression roughly
twice as severe as America’s 1929-33) and recovery
in 1999-2008 followed by a steep drop of 8 percent in
2009 and a return to growth of about 4 percent in 2010.
Russia’s economy could improve in the years
ahead, given its extreme economic backwardness,
through technology transfer, gradual gains in market efficiency and the windfall benefits of high natural resource prices,44 but not enough to significantly
close the gap with its rivals. Sovereign debt issues in
the European Union and America could help Russia
keep up for a while,45 but would also dampen western import demand from the Federation, and place
downward pressure on natural resource prices, essential to Russia’s financial well-being. Similarly, Beijing’s fast growing market communist system might
seem to provide a glimmer of hope because the Russian and Chinese systems share many common traits,
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and their per capita incomes are on a par (Figure 2-3).
But Russia is unlikely to capitalize on its advantages
of relative backwardness because the Kremlin views
foreign investors and outsourcers more as adversaries
seeking resource rents than as business partners.46 Of
course, Putin still has an ace in the hole. If one believes
in miracles, then Russia can abandon Muscovy and
transition.47

Source: Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics.

Figure 2-3. East-West Divergence and Convergence
1500-2006 China versus the EU per capita GDP
(Western Europe = 100).
Some political scientists will consider this assessment pessimistic. They have faith in the march of
human progress and are adept at finding auspicious
signs. This was the stock-in-trade of the International
Money Fund (IMF) and World Bank during the transition euphoria of the 1990s and 2000s, before 2009.48
These institutions and others insisted that as modernization and globalization raised living standards in
less developed countries, emerging nations would in-
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evitably forsake authoritarianism for democratic free
enterprise.49 Although, the prediction clearly has gone
awry in the Federation, the hope persists that Russia’s
transition merely has been delayed because its per
capita GDP now exceeds $10,000, computed in current dollars with an overvalued ruble exchange rate.50
This hypothesis cannot be disproven, even though the
Kremlin has had ample opportunity during the past
half millennium to quit Muscovy, but the internal
signs are not propitious. Putin is not wavering, and
Obama’s “reset” hasn’t triggered a popular domestic
ground swell for democratic free enterprise.
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CHAPTER 3
REFORM OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY
AND SECURITY APPARATUS:
AN INVESTIGATOR’S PERSPECTIVE
Mark Galeotti
In February 2008, President Minister Vladimir Putin said that Russia’s armed forces had become more
mobile and combat-ready than ever before.1 Then
in August, Russia unleashed those forces on its far
smaller neighbor, Georgia. Moscow had been preparing for this conflict for a couple of years and was able
to deploy 35,000-40,000 Russian troops and allied auxiliaries against up to 15,000 Georgian troops. The Russians also had clear air and naval superiority and also
a preponderance of heavy firepower. They won, but
that was never seriously in doubt. The real lesson was
that they did not win more quickly, more cheaply, and
more decisively. Their tactics were often drawn from
the Soviet playbook, and often dictated by the lack
of effective, modern command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) and night vision systems
and the weaknesses of the aging global navigation
satellite system (GLONASS). Although the Georgians
were strategically inept, on a tactical level they often
proved not just better equipped than the Russians, but
also more flexible.2
The Kremlin could and did congratulate itself on
a successful military-political adventure that at once
humbled an upstart neighbor and reminded the other
states of post-Soviet Eurasia that Russia’s claims to it
as an area in which Moscow has “privileged interests”
(in President Dmitry Medvedev’s words3) are backed
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with muscle. At the same time, though, the war provided a clear test of the military, and one that identified equally clear shortcomings. This was seized upon
by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his Chief
of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, as ammunition
in their campaign to bring meaningful reform to the
military. They had been appointed in 2007 and 2008,
respectively—despite serious misgivings about both
of them within the high command—with an explicit
mandate to that effect. However, from the first, they
faced open opposition and covert resistance, and it
would take the Georgian conflict to force their recalcitrant generals to accept the need for radical change in
the name of modernization and operational effectiveness. As Makarov noted, “We had serious drawbacks
in the conflict and learned a number of lessons. We
will deal with them as soon as possible.”4
Thus in October 2008, Serdyukov announced a farreaching package of reforms intended to break away
from the old Soviet-model armed forces based on the
expectation of fighting a mass, conventional war on
the plains of Europe or northern China. The main elements were a reduction in the total size of the military
from 1,130,000 to one million, with a particular pruning in the bloated officer corps (to shrink from 355,000
to 150,000); the replacement of conscript sergeants
with professionals; further efforts to attract and retain
good-quality kontraktnik (contracted) volunteers, in
part through significant pay rises; the abandonment of
the division as the basic building block of the ground
forces, to be replaced by more flexible and smaller
brigades; and eliminating skeleton units whose only
role was to be ready to accommodate reservists in a
time of general mobilization.5 This represented a dramatic reorientation of Russia’s military structures and
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thinking and could only have been done with the full
support of both Vladimir Putin and Medvedev. It also
represented a major logistical challenge, but nonetheless the initial stage, the reorganization of divisions
into brigades and the dissolution of numerous under-strength formations (only 17 percent were fullymanned and operationally ready6), was carried out
through 2009 with surprising ease and speed. By the
end of the year, 203 army divisions, many of which
existed only in part or on paper, had been replaced by
around 70 brigades (to rise to 83).7
If Russia is to go through a truly meaningful and
sustainable defense reform, though, this can only be
the first step. Ultimately, reform will have to go further
even than Serdyukov and Makarov admit or probably
even realize if Russia is to be able to create genuinely
world-class forces able to match those of the first-rank
powers of the day into the next several decades and
to be able to do so without bankrupting the state. This
will mean continued reductions in the total strength
of the military, not least so as dramatically to reduce
the dependence on conscription—perhaps even finally to carry out long-standing promises to transition
to an all-volunteer army. In the process, Russia will
also have to develop a credible and forward-looking
doctrine and operational art matching a realistic set of
threats and potential missions. Meanwhile, a stubborn
resistance to buying foreign-made equipment, which
is admittedly now being broken down, will have to
give way to a realistic appraisal of the limits of Russia’s defense industries.
All in all, this will represent a comprehensive assault not just on the self-interest of many senior officers (especially as cuts continue to reduce the number
of general rank positions) but also the self-image of
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the military as a whole. As Dale Herspring has put
it, “the closest comparison of these reforms, in terms
of magnitude, is the early communist period when a
totally new structure was imposed on the remnants of
the Bolshevik Army.”8 There has been inevitable resistance from within the high command, as well as a
rising tide of complaint within the ranks as a whole.
After all, Serdyukov’s announcements led to a volatile situation in which expectations have risen more
quickly than conditions and living standards for most
soldiers remain appalling. There is thus a growing and
sometimes orchestrated backlash against Serdyukov’s
reforms. Speaking to veterans and serving soldiers in
Moscow around the 2011 Den’ Pobedy (Victory Day)
celebrations, I was struck by how persistently they deployed the language and imagery of a “crime” against
the military. This kind of language even seems to have
been adopted by ordinary soldiers and junior-level officers, men who received a very poor deal in the old
order and who are benefiting from slow but real improvements in pay and conditions, as well as the twosteps-forward-one-and-a-half-steps back campaign
against the pervasive culture of Dedovshchina (violent, rank-based bullying) and the exploitation of the
rank-and-file by the senior officer corps. The worrying
prospect is that this could conceivably be the start of
some new iteration of a Weimar Germany-style “stab
in the back” myth9 in the future, providing fertile soil
for a nationalist-military alliance. In the shorter term,
though, it is more likely part of a political campaign to
make the Serdyukov-Makarov reform program politically unpalatable, especially on the eve of parliamentary (December 2011) and presidential (March 2012)
elections.
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Nonetheless, this rhetorical device does suggest
a potentially interesting alternative way to conceptualize the reform program and its prospects and
preconditions for success. If crime this be, then what
better framework to understand it than the Sledovatel’
or Russian police investigator’s traditional trinity of
means, motive and opportunity? Analyses of military
reform tend to focus on specific policies or practical
constraints, from the demographic to the economy.
They also often fail to address quite what “success”
may be, and in this case, it means not just carrying
Serdyukov’s changes through to completion, but doing so in such a way as to leave Russia with viable, usable armed forces meeting the country’s political needs
and economic resources. Traditional analyses are entirely valid and useful,10 but maybe it is also helpful
to break the preconditions for reform down into more
thematic and less specific categories and seek to quantify them. For each of nine separate preconditions,
an assessment will be made of the plausibility that it
will provide the necessary support for reform, ranging from “No” (1), through “Unlikely” (2), “Possible”
(3), “Likely” (4) and “Almost Certain” (5). From these,
it will be possible simply to identify the nature and
spread of preconditions met and unmet for long-term
and self-sustaining reform, and briefly to compare the
military’s prospects with those of the police and the
security and intelligence apparatus.
MEANS
At the risk of being extraordinarily banal, without
the ability to commit a crime, no crime can be committed. Likewise, there are certain fundamental prerequisites without which no military reform is even
plausible.
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Conceptual Capacity.
In many ways the hardest thing, especially within
political systems with limited genuine pluralism of
views (which Russia undoubtedly remains), is to be
able to generate a viable and compelling vision for
change. It is relatively easy to develop plans built upon
relatively minor, incremental change: similar but better weapons, slightly fewer soldiers who are slightly
better trained, fixing specific problems that have come
to light. Stripped of grandiose rhetoric, this was, in essence, the basis for most of Russia’s proposed military
“reform” programs (not that they deserved this name)
through the 1990s and into the 2000s. There certainly
were those who could see and advocated more substantive changes, but they were marginalized by a
range of factors: a lack of resources, a belief that maintaining a large army provided security and prestige,
the self-interest of the officer corps, and an unwillingness of the part of the political elite to confront the
Siloviki, the political lobby that formed around active
and former military and security officers.
However, there does seem to be grounds for cautious optimism on this front. In 2010 a new military
doctrine was adopted that, while fundamentally very
close to its 2000 predecessor, does represent a welcome intrusion of a modicum of realism into Russian
defense thinking. That does not, of course, necessarily
mean that it makes Russia a less problematic country
for its neighbors or the wider world. While on the one
hand, the 2010 doctrine embodies a grudging retreat
from claims to a truly global status, on the other, it
articulates a much sharper and arguably more aggressive assertion of its regional power status and, indeed,
its claims to hegemony in post-Soviet Eurasia.11 Maybe
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Moscow has come to realize the wisdom of Frederick
the Great’s dictum, that if you try to hold everything,
you hold nothing. The last years of the Medvedev
presidency saw less global grandstanding and needless posturing, including hints of a more positive
line on preventing Iranian nuclear armament after he
expressed alarm at U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) reports of the program.12 However, this was not
so much conciliatory as reflecting an acknowledgement that it is better to focus effort and political capital on what really matters to Russia. There certainly
has been no relaxation in efforts to secure Eurasian
hegemony and eject foreign influence from the region.
Together this does imply an erosion of some of the
assumptions of the 1990s and even 2000s, which were
still in so many ways informed by Soviet-era (or rather, Brezhnevian) beliefs as to Moscow’s place in the
world and global role. In place of skeletal divisions
intended as little more than vessels for mobilized
reserves, the army has been reorganized into higherreadiness brigades designed for interventions that, in
Serdyukov’s words, are “more flexible, mobile, and
modern,”13 with brigade commanders expected to be
able to use an unprecedented—for a Russian army—
degree of personal initiative.14 After a lengthy period of
neglect—receiving virtually no new aircraft between
1995 and 2008—the air force is being modernized with
an eye to ground support and air defense rather than
long-range operations; and the navy, while proudly
vaunting a blue-water capability and talking of future aircraft carrier battle groups, is actually shifting
to smaller, multipurpose vessels geared more for defense and (possibly multinational) peacekeeping and
intervention operations. A reformed military, after all,
is meant to be a more usable one.
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That said, though, there is still a clear disconnect
between broad political beliefs about the importance
of change and a coherent and, above all, operationalized reform program. There is a reasonable, if not
especially impressive, amount of thinking and research taking place as to how military structures can
be operated and fight at a brigade level or lower, even
if it remains to be seen how well it will be applied.
Chief of the General Staff Makarov, who has a professional background in the area, has put considerable
emphasis on the need to improve the level of practical training taking place. Beyond basic technical skills,
though, training must reflect both doctrine and operational art, and here issues arise. There seems, after all,
to be a dearth of clear and effective thought about how
reform affects the strategic and operational levels—
ironically two strengths of the old Soviet system. In
March 2011, Makarov made a strongly-worded attack
on the work of the Academy of the Military Sciences,
clear evidence that much needs to be done. His attack
also showed his (and Serdyukov’s) recognition of the
need for a decisive break with old thinking. “In the
past 20 years, we were not able to bring military art up
to a modern level and we continued to live with obsolete concepts about the nature of modern wars,” he
said.15 This problem is exacerbated by the torpor of the
General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU),
its main planning and coordinating organ. After the
removal of Colonel General Alexandr Rukshin, a vocal opponent of reform, in 2008, the GOU was without
a head for several months. Then the position went to
Lieutenant General Sergei Surovikin, a fighting general brought in to purge the GOU, not inject any new
ideas. He lasted just over a year, and his successor,
Lieutenant General Andrei Tretyak, who was no in-
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tellectual powerhouse, requested dismissal on health
grounds in mid-2011. He was eventually formally removed in October and replaced by Lieutenant General
Vladimir Zarudnitskii, a line officer with a respectable
but hardly inspirational pedigree. Meanwhile, the
GOU has been cut by three quarters, to 150 officers,
arguably at the very time when it is most needed.16
Thus it is impossible to be entirely optimistic.
There does seem to be a greater awareness than at any
time since 1991 of the invalidity of the Soviet-legacy
military policies that have dominated Russian security thinking. There are also some people thinking hard
about how to adapt to a new world of network-centric
warfare and limited interventions. However, there are
not enough, and in many cases, they are still either
marginalized or else being forced to think at a purely
tactical level.
Overall Assessment: Possible (3)
Economic Capacity.
Reform costs money. Although we have no firm
figures for the total reform package, military rearmament alone in the 2011-20 State Armaments Program
is meant to cost 19.4 trillion rubles ($688.35 billion)
to 2020, and Medvedev pledged that the state would
continue to spend at least 2.8 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) on defense until then.17 In this context
of the fall-out from the 2008 global economic slowdown and uncertainty as to long-term fluctuations in
the oil and gas prices on which the Russian tax base
depends, it is legitimate to ask whether Russia has the
money now and will it in the next decade.
Although Steven Rosefielde expresses his doubts
in Chapter 2 of this collection about the long-term
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prospects of the Russian economy compared with that
of Western Europe, when it comes to funding military
reform, again, there is scope for some cautious optimism. Despite the long-term problems facing the Russian economy, which will almost certainly impact the
Kremlin’s aspirations, short- and long-term projections alike suggest that while Moscow may not have as
much money as it would like (who does?), it will have
enough to be able to continue a viable reform program
and maintain credible forces capable of both national
defense and at least a limited power projection role.
As of this writing, the World Bank is currently projecting 4 percent economic growth in 2011 (the Russians themselves claim 4.1 percent), which compares
with the global figure of 3.2 percent the World Bank
is predicting.18 Further out, the Euromonitor predicts
that Russia will have the world’s fifth largest economy
by 2010, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) assesses
that even by 2050 it will be the sixth largest.19
Of course, it is vital to appreciate—over and above
the pitfalls of any such projections—the associated
variables coming to bear here. What proportion of national budget will the leadership be willing and able to
devote to the military (which relates to the Will factor
discussed below)? According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for example,
2010 saw the real spending on national security reach
5 percent of GDP compared with the official 2.8 percent, suggesting that even under Medvedev, there was
a determination to maintain a strong defense spend.20
Will this money be spent wisely (which, to a large extent, depends on the realization of sufficient Conceptual Capacity) and what proportion will be embezzled
or devoured by inappropriate procurement, padded
supplier prices, and excessive margins (which will de-
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pend on suitable Human Capacity, Traction with Agents
and Traction with Suppliers)? Nonetheless, in raw terms
it looks as if the Kremlin will have the money to spend
on reform, albeit not without having to withhold it
from other, arguably more important sectors, such as
health and infrastructure.
Overall Assessment: Likely (4)
Human Capacity.
In other words, are there the people to enact
change, whether effective leaders at the top, or those
with the necessary skills or capacities at the bottom?
Military reform in Russia entails limited downsizing,
but a more than proportionate qualitative improvement in the training and ability of the remaining soldiers. There is a need for able and above all committed personnel to manage the process, both at the top
and also lower down the structure. More to the point,
there is also the need for adequate numbers of common soldiers.
Within the senior command structure, it is hard to
be wholly bullish. The Serdyukov-Makarov combine
has proven unexpectedly successful, but is beleaguered. It has drawn on capable individuals outside
the military structure, including Deputy Ministers
Anatoly Antonov, Dmitri Chushkin, Tatiana Shevtsova, Mikhail Mokretsov, Nikolai Pankov, and Alexander Sukhorukov (First Deputy Minister for procurement). Antonov hails from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; Pankov, the secret police (KGB/FSB) apparatus; Chushkin, Mokretsov, and Shevtsova, from the
tax service (Serdyukov’s old fiefdom); and Sukhorukov also spent some time within the tax service as well
as the finance ministry and prime minister’s office.
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As of this writing, of the eight deputy ministers, only
two—Makarov and Dmitri Bulgakov (responsible for
logistics)—are career military.
On one level, this is a liability and a sign of Serdyukov’s relative isolation within the ministry (pointing to problems exerting Traction with Agents). It has
sometimes led not only to clashes with the General
Staff apparatus and the service chiefs but also to signs
of a lack of a full understanding of how a national military works. In October 2008, for example, Serdyukov
announced plans to reduce the number of officers in
the military from 355,000 to 150,000, complaining that
the current structure of the military was “like an egg,
swollen in the middle, we have more colonels and
lieutenant-colonels than junior officers,” and with far
too many officers than regular soldiers.21 By the end
of 2010, some 129,000 officers had been discharged—
but in March 2011 he then reversed his position and
announced that the size of the officer corps would be
increased from 150,000 to 220,000 by 2012, a process
that would in part involve rehiring former officers.22
He presented this in terms of the need for highly-qualified technical specialists for the new unified Aerospace Defense Command created in 2011.23 In fact, this
u-turn also seems to have reflected not just unease at
the scale of resistance from officers, veterans’ associations and some political lobbies, but also a failure to
consider the full need for capacity to cover periods of
leave and illness. On the other hand, while the new
defense ministry elite may lack the ingrained expertise of their uniformed predecessors, their ascendancy
does also mean that there is scope for new thinking
unconstrained by tradition, arm of service loyalty, and
peer pressure, all of which played a substantial role in
the past.
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Further down the chain of command, modified
training programs and above all the new emphasis on
noncommissioned officer (NCO) training will have a
real impact on the nature and character of the Russian tactical command structure if they are carried
through. It is proving difficult to build up a reliable
and effective cohort of professional NCOs, despite creating a new specialized training program in Ryazan.24
Nonetheless, a professionalized and competent NCO
corps (even if initially there will be too few of them),
combined with more effective training for junior officers, would address some of the key problems of
the military. More NCOs would slowly free up junior
officers from many of the inappropriate duties they
currently carry out and also provide a sideways response to their shortage: even if it is not possible to
increase their total number, the pressure will be eased
by reducing the need for them. This would open up
wider reform opportunities; for example, qualitative
improvements permit further quantitative reductions.
The question is whether this can come to pass.
Above all, will there be enough soldiers? In 2009,
following the reduction in the draft from 2 years to
1, some 575,000 young Russians were conscripted, a
figure that fell to 540,000 in 2010. In 2011, by contrast,
the projected figure is 353,000.25 Present plans would
suggest that, with a 12-month national service cycle,
the Russian army needs 600,000-700,000 draftees a
year—near enough the full cohort of young Russian
males reaching draft age. Given that this is a shrinking
pool and thanks to health, education, and other exemptions and deferments, only around 400,000 are actually eligible, this appears an intractable challenge.26
Furthermore, the 1-year term locks the military into a
regular and disruptive churn of personnel and scarce-
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ly provides the time for adequate training. One officer
in a brigade regarded as one of the better ones in the
Moscow region told me that it takes 9 months for the
recruits to be “soldiers rather than trainees,” and their
last month is often marked by premature “demob happiness,” such that he felt they only really were truly
effective for 2 months. That said, it is not likely that a
return to 2-year national service would be politically
palatable to the Kremlin, even though the Communist
Party has advocated an 18-month term.27
However, there are signs of awareness of this. Makarov is now talking of an ideal figure of 10-15 percent
of the armed forces being conscripts,28 which would
mean only 100,000-150,000 draftees a year. While to
date the kontraktniki experiment has not been a particular success, this was to a considerable extent due
to active resistance and sabotage within the military.29
Given that the recent trend has been for a hemorrhage
of contract soldiers, it may seem naive to be at all optimistic.30 However, these are not intractable problems.
There are questions as to whether the planned pay
increases—by 2012, regular contract soldiers will receive 35,000 rubles a month ($1,130)—will be enough,
especially as the militarized elements of the security
apparatus will probably be willing to top this.31 Nonetheless professionalization could be addressed by a
combination of greater buy-in (or discipline) within
the military, higher wages, and a general economic
slowdown. After all, while the unemployment rate
has fallen from 7.5 percent to 6.4 percent in later 2011,
many of these new jobs are in very low-salary sectors,
against which a military career may look appealing.
If Serdyukov succeeds in his efforts to “humanize”
military service with better food and accommodation,
more scope for leave and the outsourcing of the more
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menial duties characteristically assigned to soldiers—
and which occupied up to a third of their day, eating
into training time—this might also improve the prospects for recruitment and retention.32
In the longer term, there is also scope for further
shrinkage of the military to a size more in keeping
with Russia’s economic and demographic capacities.
Former deputy defense minister Vitaly Shlykov, perhaps the doyen of Russia’s defense analysts, has expressed the view that half a million well-trained and
motivated soldiers are better than a force twice the
size that is also full of the inept, the badly-trained, the
criminal and the unfit.33 In 2011, the Russian Institute
of Contemporary Development (INSOR), a think tank
meant to be close to Medvedev, published a major report on Discovering the Future: Strategy 2012 that advocated creating an all-volunteer military some 400,000500,000 strong by 2018, even at the cost of increasing
defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP.34 This is unrealistic, not least in its time frame, but this kind of
prescription is even gaining some traction within the
ranks, too. In conversation with some officers from
the GOU, I even heard the suggestion that someday
Russia might have the same soldier-to-population ratio as France, which would imply a military cut to a
strength of 460,000-470,000. This is hardly likely in the
immediate future, but it was interesting to hear it being floated by a hard-nosed career soldier who clearly
wants and anticipates further promotion. Either way,
demographic pressures make the status quo increasingly untenable. Medvedev is on record as saying that
“for the next 10-15 years, [Russia’s] recruiting system
should combine both conscription and contracting”
without comment about the balance between professionals and draftees.35 Whether through dramatic
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force reductions, by conscripting and recruiting women, or professionalizing the military—or a combination of the three—Russia will have to make substantial
changes.
Overall Assessment: Likely (4)
MOTIVE
Crimes are committed for a reason; reforms likewise. After all, change is harder than continuity, even
if the latter means a shabby decline that seeks to retain
the forms of the past while losing its real nature. In
the short term, reform is also usually more expensive.
Maintaining the appearance of the status quo was
good enough for Leonid Brezhnev and in a way Boris
Yeltsin, too. Given that, what reasons would the national leadership have to grasp the nettle of reform?
Threat.
How far has Russia’s perception of the near- and
long-term threats it faces changed? This is a difficult
one to assess, as rhetorically one could argue that worryingly little has moved on. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is still regarded as an actively
hostile bloc, whose expansion into Eurasia is listed
in the 2010 doctrine as the greatest military danger
(which is admittedly different from a threat) to Russia.
Likewise, attempts to “destabilize states and regions”
near Russia—to Moscow, events such as the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” and Georgian “Rose Revolution” proved not that people wanted change, but that
nefarious Westerners were engineering pro-democracy movements in Eurasia—are explicitly listed as a
danger in that document. Moscow’s take on the Arab
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Spring, and Libya in particular, have only sharpened
this genuine belief in a conspiratorial pattern to global
developments. This certainly came up in the context of
the Tsentr” 2011 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises, in which the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force was deployed to put down a putative coup
attempt in Tajikistan.36 Makarov made the connection
explicit: “The processes taking place in North Africa
and the Middle East were difficult to forecast. . . .
This has to be a warning to all states. We have similar
questions for the Central Asian countries. We must be
prepared for anything. This is why we are practicing
with these drills.”37
All this sounds as if Moscow still believes it must
prepare for both a mass war against invaders from the
west or the east as well as for major military incursions as the gendarme of Eurasia.38 However, the detail and the pattern of military organization and procurement suggest a more nuanced perception of the
threats facing Russia. The switch to brigades provided
an opportunity to move away from the implicit planning assumption that military manpower and organizational policies were ultimately to be determined
by the need to maintain a mobilization structure for
a multi-million-man mass army. This has long been
a crucial planning constraint and also led to a huge
wastage of resources on facilities and equipment being maintained for a someday-never Big War. To be
sure, Russia still fears and plans for a future confrontation with China,39 but it is increasingly coming to
terms that such a conflict would not be the Great Patriotic War redux so much as one to be deterred through
the ability to focus high-impact forces in specific crucial engagements, political alliances, and the threat
of tactical or strategic nuclear response. Likewise,
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NATO is still seen as a challenge, even a threat, but
not a military one. Its efforts to undermine friendly
regimes, woo the undecided, and exclude Russia from
its rightful place—as Moscow perceives it—can best
be dealt with through a combination of bare-knuckled
diplomacy, energy politics, and the creation of credible, rapidly-deployable intervention forces.
After all, if by its deeds Russia does not seem to see
a serious threat of mass war, it certainly is developing
the capacity to deploy smaller intervention forces regionally. For example, the emphasis in procurement is
largely on lighter forces more capable of rapid deployment, local intervention and full-spectrum warfare.
From the decision to expand and re-equip the complement of snipers within the army, especially in eastern
formations,40 as well as spending on wheeled vehicles
rather than tanks, to the money being spent on the
fighter fleet (even while the long-range bomber fleet is
decaying) and C3I systems, following the money suggests Russia is at last waking up in more than just a
rhetorical way to the age of network-centric warfare.
The primary threats for which Russia is practically
preparing itself for are not massive conventional conflicts but smaller-scale interventions in Eurasia (and
conceivably within Russia) which will shade across
from military aid to the civil power through to rapid
incursions to effect political change.
Overall Assessment: Almost Certain (5)
Value.
This is the flip-side complement of the previous
point: has the leadership changed its notion of the
benefits it can derive from its armed forces? To an extent, this can simply be posed as a question: would a

78

reformed military do a better job responding to the
kind of threats envisaged? The successful (in Moscow’s eyes) outcomes of the Georgian operation—for
all the numerous failures in actual execution—certainly point to the value of having the capacity to launch
effective interventions in Russia’s strategic neighborhood. Likewise, the rescue from Somali pirates of the
tanker Moscow University and its crew by naval infantry from the destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov in 2010 is
still held up as an example of precise and professionally-executed power projection that married military
and political success.
Although the Kremlin continues to harbor certain
long-term and existential fears, especially around
China’s future capabilities and intentions, its current
thinking appears to be that it will benefit from armed
forces that are sufficiently professional and wellequipped to be usable without a massive advantage in
numbers; that can be mobilized and deployed quickly;
and that are flexible enough for a variety of missions,
from limited intervention and counter-insurgency to
out-of-area peacekeeping and all-out war. Serdyukov
has described his goal as creating “a performance-capable, mobile, and maximally armed army and navy
ready to participate in three regional and local conflicts, at a minimum.”41 In keeping with this, Russia’s
transport air fleet is being expanded, with plans to buy
an extra 35-40 Il-476 planes from 2014 to supplement
the existing Il-76 fleet and Ukrainian-built An-70s for
2015-16.
These kinds of forces are also more relevant to the
kind of multinational operations that the Kremlin is
willing to entertain. The 2010 doctrine makes explicit
reference to Russia’s “right” to intervene to protect
Russian nationals abroad, a right clearly invoked
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during the 2008 Georgian war. Likewise, the CSTO’s
Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (KSOR) formed in
2009, while formally under multilateral control, are
essentially dominated by Moscow. When Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenka suggested that
KSOR could be used to suppress attempts at regime
change within CSTO member countries—because, in
his words, “nobody is going to wage a conventional
frontline war against us, but there are quite a lot of
those whose fingers itch to carry out a coup d’etat”—
he received a cool response from Moscow.42 However,
CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha separately said the CSTO might intervene when member
states’ governments “are unable to protect the constitutional order, the lives and safety of citizens are
threatened, and violent mass disorders are under
way.”43 The difference between the two is essentially in detail, and it is clear that the Kremlin—whose
views dictate Bordyuzha’s—is happy to see the KSOR
or other CSTO forces deployed in Russian-led stability
operations, which would help consolidate Moscow’s
regional hegemony.
When Kyrgyzstan’s interim government appealed
for Russian and CSTO aid in 2010 to put down a violent insurrection in the south, Moscow demurred, not
least because it lacked the kind of forces trained for
public order duties and able to be mobilized to the
country in time. However, military reform will provide those forces, with brigades notionally ready for
deployment within an hour of alert (although rarely
will this actually be possible) and an increasing number receiving specialized training, equipping them for
missions ranging from Arctic warfare to peacekeeping
and public order.44 In this way, a reformed military is
also a foreign policy asset, a tool to support friendly
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regimes in Eurasia and, by implication, put pressure
on those not fully aligned with Moscow.45
Overall Assessment: Almost Certain (5)
Spin-off.
The irony of military forces is that they are configured, recruited, armed, and trained to fight wars, yet
typically spend most of their time not fighting. (Even
at the peak of the Soviet-Afghan War, for example,
Russia’s most extensive military action since the 1968
invasion of Czechoslovakia, no more than around
150,000 troops were deployed at any one time out of a
military establishment of some two million.) Fighting
and deterring wars may be the military’s main role,
but they also have many others, from socializing minorities to supporting the economy. It is thus important also to consider the incidental or subsidiary benefits associated with reform, over and above how well
the armed forces actually fight wars. A number have
been noted by reformists that appear to have gained
traction in the Kremlin.
First of all, a smaller military, less of an emphasis
on conscription, and a scaling down of the militarypatriotic education infrastructure created to support
the draft, all mean less of a role for the armed forces
as tools of socialization. However, this is probably no
bad thing. Compared with the ideal of national service engendering patriotism and a sense of common
national purpose, the regular litany of miseries of
army life—bullying, poor conditions, criminality and
abuse46—has actually created a process of “shadow
socialization,” brutalizing and dismaying recruits. According to Chief Military Prosecutor Sergei Fridinskii,
crime in the army rose by 16 percent in 2010, and while
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registered crimes fell by 10.6 percent in the first half of
2011, the actual size of the military fell by a greater
amount, so in per capita terms criminality continued
to rise.47 Inevitably, this leads to crime in society as
a whole as angry and brutalized young men return
to the home front. More broadly, this has encouraged
and legitimized a culture of not only evading the draft,
but also demonizing the military in mainstream society. There is a better chance of dealing with these systemic problems (which date back long before 1991) in
a smaller, better treated, and more professional army.
In the process, a military life becomes less of a terror
and ex-soldiers less likely to be damaged, delinquent,
or disillusioned. Although this point has not been
publicly aired, the leadership may also be aware that
a more professional army might not only be insulated
from some of the wider social problems of Russian society, as well as contributing to them, but also be less
politically expensive to use: the sad truth is that the
wider public tends to have a more permissive view of
professional soldiers’ deaths than those of conscripts.
More significant is the extent to which military
reform is seen as a way of taming the defense budget. Not to allow reductions, as there is a clear awareness of the cost of retraining, rearmament, and the
retention of good soldiers. Rather, to tackle the extraordinarily high level of waste and embezzlement
of state budgets earmarked for military purposes (in
other words, to address the problem of Traction with
Agents). In this respect, a new enthusiasm for buying
foreign-made military technology—French landing
ships, Italian FIAT IVECO light armored vehicles,
Israeli drones—not only acts as a useful corrective to
the power and entitlements of the domestic arms industry, it also offers the prospect of accessing at least
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a degree of advanced Western technology as well as
providing a stimulus for development of the domestic
defense industrial sector. The Tatarstan-based Kamaz
enterprise, for example, will assemble Russia’s new
M65 light armored vehicles, while collaboration deals
for Mistral amphibious landing ships are driving the
construction of new shipyards on Kotlin island near
St Petersburg.48 At least as important are current and
future deals for C3I systems and co-production agreements with Western companies considering Russia’s
evident technological lag, as domestic projects such as
the YeSU TZ automated command and control system
continue to be delayed and problematic.49
In short, there are collateral political, social, and
economic benefits that could potentially accrue from
radical defense reform. In the process, this not only
gives the Kremlin more reason to forge ahead (supporting its political Will), it also provides a further rationale for assigning the necessary resources to reform
(the Economic Capacity).
Overall Assessment: Likely (4)
OPPORTUNITY
Having the intention and capability to commit a
crime is not enough in and of itself: there also needs
to be the opportunity. Likewise, without the necessary
political and practical context, no reform program can
succeed.
Will.
Sustained political will is a crucial prerequisite for
any substantial (and expensive) military reform, one
which will take not months, but years or even up to a
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couple of decades. This is often a particular problem
within a democratic system, as it requires a degree of
consensus able to survive changes in government and
the crises and concerns du jour. In this respect, Russia
is actually at an advantage in that so far the Putin-led
regime has proven stable and lasting, spanning across
the Medvedev presidency and, with the latter’s September 2011 endorsement, beyond the 2012 presidential elections, potentially out to 2024.
Despite differences in nuance and idiom, both Putin and Medvedev have been united on the basic outlines of military reform and thus—unless derailed by
events or wider political calculations—it can be presumed that the present policy will extend for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the regime appears disinclined to tolerate open resistance from the military for
a combination of reasons ranging from practicality to
an ingrained Soviet-era fear of “Bonapartism.” While
there is still scope for foot-dragging by the generals,
there is no credible threat of open defiance.
Overall Assessment: Almost Certain (5)
Traction with Agents.
Can the subject of reform be made to embrace the
process? After all, as Rod Thornton has put it, “The
Russian military, as a whole, does not want to modernize; or rather, it does not want to be ‘modernized’ in
the way that its political masters want.”50
The extent to which the military high command, or
key elements within it, is hostile to reform is apparent
and well-known. It is also clear that while Serdyukov
and Makarov dispose of the political firepower to deal
with particular egregious or isolated critics, they are
not able to purge the senior officer corps as a whole,
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not least because of the lack of suitably effective and
like-minded alternatives. Even apparent allies may
prove to be less reliable once in place, especially as
they are worked on by the rest of the military elite.
For example, when Ground Forces commander-inchief Colonel General Vladimir Boldyrev retired in
2010, he was replaced by Colonel General Alexander
Postnikov. Former commander of the Siberian military district and perhaps more importantly a former
subordinate of Makarov’s, he was seen—not least by
Makarov—as “his” man. In practice, though, by late
2011 Postnikov appears to be trying to tread a delicate line between implementing reforms and resisting
them where they are seen as impinging on the interests of the Ground Forces.
On the other hand, the regular departures from
senior positions as well as the risk of actually worsening one’s institution’s position by being seen as recalcitrant (several naval officers feel—rightly or wrongly—that the decision to move their headquarters to St
Petersburg was a punishment for their efforts to lobby
politicians against change and a failure to make efficiency savings) may be beginning to act as a deterrent to resistance. Furthermore, it is vital to appreciate that the high command is not a monolithic lobby.
Sometimes, there is more sound than fury in apparent
protests, and conspiracies and protests can actually be
explained away by other processes or bureaucratic infighting between factions and interests rather than opposition to reform.51 However, this is not to underplay
the problem. As the Kontraktniki debacle demonstrated, if the military hierarchy is opposed to change and
adequate control mechanisms are not in place, then
they have a wealth of opportunities to derail reform.
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If the high command can be tamed, then the rest
of the officer corps will probably follow, so long as
the resources are provided (requiring Economic Capacity) to attract, retain, and motivate them (meaning
Human Capacity). If the program to expand a cadre of
trained, volunteer NCOs succeeds, then this will also
be a great asset, even if the planned abolition of the
otherwise-redundant warrant officer rank—a process
launched in 2008 and then reportedly frozen in 2010—
goes ahead.52
However, throughout the armed forces a remaining key control variable is criminality and indiscipline.53 The dedovshchina that still grips the rank and
file is debilitating and counter-productive,54 but arguably more serious are the challenges of embezzlement,
corruption, and organized criminality throughout.
The creation of a new military police force in 2011 under Makarov’s apparent leg-breaker-in-chief Surovikin may conceivably help, but it will take years for
this to be properly operational.55 In the mean time,
military corruption drains and diverts the defense
budget: some reports say up to a third is embezzled,
while the Military Procurator’s Office has put the
figure at 20 percent.56 A personal estimate—subjective as it is, based largely on open source reports and
anecdotal accounts—suggests 5-7 percent is actually
stolen, with perhaps as much again instead diverted
to alternative functions (such as providing repairs for
officers’ apartments that ought to have been covered
by military funds), for a total of 10-14 percent lost, still
equivalent to more than $8.8 billion.57 This culture of
endemic corruption also fosters indiscipline and selfinterested and mutually-protective cabals of criminalized officers.
Overall Assessment: Possible (3)
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Traction with Suppliers.
One of the crucial, if often subterranean, forces impeding meaningful reform has been the role of the defense industries as lobbyists and also as the dominant
players in their relationship with the defense ministry,
forcing them to accept equipment not of the specification they wanted or else, more often, late and overprice (so unlike the situation in the West). Insofar as
reform depends on technological modernization and
the effective use of finite resources, the ability to force
suppliers to comply with the needs of the process thus
becomes a critical potential constraint.
This helps explain the failure of successive iterations of the Gosoboronzakaz (GOZ), or State Armaments
Order.58 Speaking to a State Duma hearing on the draft
2012-14 budget in October 2011, Deputy Minister of
Economic Development Andrei Klepach admitted that
the 2011 GOZ “will not be substantially fulfilled this
year and it is highly probable it will not be fulfilled
next year.”59 At the same hearing, Valery Goreglyad,
Deputy Chair of the Audit Chamber, criticized the (in)
effectiveness of the GOZ process and called for a completely new process to assign and manage orders. It
has been estimated that the 2010 GOZ was 30 percent
unfulfilled: according to Boris Nakonechnyi, deputy
head of the Defense Ministry’s Directorate of State
Defense Order Formation, that year a corvette, three
submarines, three of nine ordered Yak-130 trainer aircraft, and 73 of 151 ordered BMP-3 infantry fighting
vehicles were never received.60
After all, the failure of the Russian military-industrial complex (VPK) to meet its orders has become
legendary. For example, the RSM-56 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic nuclear missile has suffered a
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string of failed tests (although 2011 may have been the
year it turned the corner) while the Borey-class submarines built to mount it are waiting for it to become
operational. In part, this reflects a simple inability to
master the technical challenges of new-generation systems. In part, it is a product of inefficiency and clumsy
management practices. At the end of 2010, an official from Rostekhnologii, the state holding company
tasked with supporting defense research and export,
admitted that many of the defense firms it was forced
to take over were, to all intents, bankrupt because of
embezzlement, mismanagement, problems meeting
the state defense order, obsolescent technologies, and
a lack of development capital.61 Given that, as one article in the specialist press bemoaned, “The Russian
military industrial complex is basically equipped with
aging Soviet equipment, and in need of fundamental
modernization”—according to another account, 70
percent of all its machinery is 20-plus years old—one
could see the solution to be a combination of better
management, more investment where it will make a
difference and allowing enterprises to go under when
it will not.62 Already even old giants of the VPK such
as the Tupolev aircraft corporation are arguably moribund.63
Yet the problem is also one of VPK culture and
political pull. Enterprises also sometimes fail to meet
defense ministry requirements and order because of a
willful refusal to prioritize domestic orders compared
with exports, given that the latter tend to offer higher
immediate profit margins or are backed by government export credits. Meanwhile, they have tended to
rely on political contacts or a simple lack of alternatives to maintain their domestic order books. As Makarov complained,
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Many producers do not want or are not able to produce prospective weaponry and military equipment.
They are turning out products that the Armed Forces
do not need. But the General Staff will no longer buy
what the Armed Forces do not need, no matter how
much the defense industry enterprises try to persuade
us to do so. Whether they like it or not.64

Citing an increase in the price of a T-90 tank from
42 million rubles in 2008 to over 100 million by 2011,
Makarov also criticized their pricing policies, something Serdyukov also made a key theme. Later in the
year, for example, he furiously attacked Sevmash for
padding the price of the Severodvinsk submarine class,
for example, saying that “We are willing to pay, but
only if the pricing process is transparent. Practice
demonstrates that if all elements in the contracts are
‘decoded,’ then it seems possible with confidence
to deduct up to 30% from the final cost of a finished
product.”65
Here there is again some evidence of reasons for
optimism, even if it must be cautious. Makarov’s and
Serdyukov’s words represented a stepping up of the
defense establishment’s rhetoric, but potentially a
more concrete step was the appointment of Alexander Sukhorukov as First Deputy Defense Minister for
procurement in August 2011. Sukhorukov was formerly Director of the Federal Service for the Defense
Order (Rosoboronzakaz or FSOZ), and so the hope appears to be that he will be a tough insider able to tame
the defense industries. There is little evidence that he
was able to be successful at this in his previous position, but insiders have suggested to me that this was
in part because of the political constraints he was under there—while Rosoboronzakaz is subordinated to
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the defense minister, it must work closely with the
VPK—and that he will be more active with his new
position. We shall see, but he has a major challenge
on his hands. The VPK is a powerful lobby which has
proven very adept at leveraging its export successes
and the fact that it employs up to 3 million workers
(20 percent of all manufacturing jobs)66 to persuade
the Kremlin to maintain what are in effect subsidies
through uneconomic orders and padded costs.
Overall Assessment: Unlikely (2)
PROSPECTS
This is, of course, in no way a serious scientific exploration, rather a thought exercise in trying to conceptualize the preconditions for meaningful reform.
Under Medvedev—albeit with Putin’s necessary
agreement—Russia’s military has embarked upon
the first stage of a long-overdue process of modernization and reconceptualization that, if sustained and
supported, could create qualitatively different armed
forces that, if not at the very leading edge, were at least
capable of operating on a modern, network-centric, in
a way today’s Russian soldier definitely cannot.
Overall, this exercise suggests that there is an unexpectedly strong potential for real and sustained military reform in Russia. However, that potential is by
no means certain to come to fruition, and it would be
very easy for the process to be derailed. For example,
were the political environment to take a further shift
towards the nationalist-statist pole, that might not
just affect all the Motive factors, but also impact on
the Means: Conceptual and Opportunity: Will. However,
an even more nationalist regime could conceivably
be even more determined to modernize its military.
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After all, reform tends to come from a combination
of fear and opportunism. Medvedev never managed
to develop any real rapport with the Siloviki, but he
probably spoke for many of them when he said, “We
cannot leave our country without the sufficient development of the Armed Forces and law-enforcement
bodies. We shall simply be torn to pieces.”67 During
Yuri Andropov’s brief tenure as General Secretary of
the Communist Party (1982-84), one of his key aims
was to force the Soviet elite to open their eyes to the
security implications of their country’s growing backwardness. As a result, one of his most powerful legacies was to change the basis for political discussion:
it no longer was about whether change was needed,
it was about what kind of change and how it should
be introduced. Likewise, for all that Medvedev himself may go down in history as a rather sad figure, a
disposable stand-in for Vladimir Putin, and his presidency may have seen a similar paradigm shift within
security discourse. Even those advocating a return
to 24-month conscription or a larger military are not
arguing for a return to a true Soviet model. By the
same token, the reformers are basing their arguments
as much as anything else on effectiveness, that a new
model army will hit harder, further and faster. After
all, military reform without political reform would
mean that an essentially authoritarian—or at best hybrid “competitive authoritarian”68—Kremlin would
become rather more capable of throwing its weight
around its strategic neighborhood. That it something
even the most hidebound general could support.
Rather more serious for the prospects of reform is
the risk that an economic slowdown would not only
hurt the Means: Economic and Means: Human columns
but potentially leave the government less able to re-
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ward its soldiers (Traction with Agents) and dictate
terms to an export-driven industrial sector (Traction
with Suppliers). Everything connects with everything
else, so a failure in one area can affect many others.
See Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Reform Prospects: The Military.
In summary, the key preconditions for meaningful
military reform would seem to be:
•	Continued political will, which will maintain
adequate spending and empower the defense
ministry to tame the high command and VPK
alike;
•	Continued economic stability and growth sufficient
to cover the high up-front costs of reform without having such a damaging impact on the rest
of the economy that it becomes politically untenable; and,
•	A realistic and comprehensive concept that draws
on the credible threats and opportunities facing
Russia and can—in due course—drive doctrine
and procurement and win over a new generation of military leaders.
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Of these, arguably the third is the hardest to achieve,
especially given the need to balance momentum and
deliberation. Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center
for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Moscow, has cited Tsarist-era modernizer Sergei Witte,
who said that, “In Russia, reforms must be carried out
quickly and in great haste. Otherwise, most will either fail or falter.”69 In political terms, he is absolutely
right, but debacles such as the flip-flops over professionalization and officer cuts, procurements blunders
such as the building of the Borey submarines before
their Bulava missiles were even close to completion,
and the decision to dismiss the head of the GOU just
before the Georgian war70 all demonstrate the danger
in over-hasty decisionmaking in defense matters. In
short, reform of Russia’s military is possible, but will
take a steady hand, a willingness to spend considerable economic and political capital in bad times as
well as good, and a clear-sighted understanding of the
real threats facing the country and a credible program
for how to address them.
A CODA: COMPARISON WITH THE SECURITY
AGENCIES
It is perhaps worth finally comparing the situation
facing the military with that of the rest of the security apparatus: the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR),
Federal Security Service (FSB), Federal Protection
Service (FSO), and the like, as well as the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD). Starting with the former, the
security and foreign intelligence services, the detail of
how these various preconditions are obviously different—dealing with “suppliers” is best conceptualized
as acquiring intelligence assets, for example. In a post-
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ideological age, though, they will be bought for coin
not commitment. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw
some broad conclusions.
There is clearly far less of an intellectual commitment for change in this sector and Putin—who even
under Medvedev asserted unchallenged personal authority in this sector—has shown no interest in substantive reform, just incremental improvement. This
is certainly not a question of a lack of funds, as the
intelligence and security sector consumes much less
than the military (Julian Cooper suggests they receive
some 14-15 percent of the military budget).71 Nor is
it that the security Siloviki are flouting efforts to impose change upon them. There have been regular turf
wars between agencies and factions, but these have
been horizontal struggles for powers, budgets, and
perquisites rather than directed against the Kremlin.
Instead, it appears that Putin and his spies and secret
policemen are united in a belief that they are doing a
not just a good job but a necessary one. After all, he
appears to see no problem to which they are not part
of the answer: even “At a time when we are facing a
problem related to modernization of the economy, assistance from the intelligence services is not superfluous.”72 Thus, there is little likelihood at present of any
reform, or even talk of it, because those responsible
see no need for it. See Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2. Reform Prospects: The Security
Agencies.
Comparing the situation of the security apparatus
and the military directly dramatizes this contrast. The
security apparatus has a score of 23—below the 27
even an across the board “Possible” would earn. Conversely, the military has a score of 35. Furthermore,
the categories in which a higher score is registered are
essentially facilitating rather than initiating ones, demonstrating that were the Kremlin ever to fix on reform,
the economic resources would certainly be available,
along with the human capacity and levers of control.
However, there is no real sense that reform would be
needed or that the real threat facing Russian democracy, stability and economic dynamism will come from
arbitrary political policing and aggressive intelligence
operations, let alone any real notion among the current elite as to what shape reform would take.
Turning to the MVD and other law-enforcement
structures, there was under Medvedev a growing appreciation of the practical advantages in reform—if
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not necessarily democratization—of policing. First of
all, the old-style “militia” were not only held in generally low esteem, they were simply not very good at
doing their job. Addressing their shortcomings not
only helps bolster the Kremlin’s bases for technocratic legitimacy, it also brings associated advantages
in establishing a more productive environment for
economic development and addressing the security
risks to be found in endemic corruption. As a result,
on March 1, 2011, a new Law on the Police came into
effect that not only saw their name changed back from
the revolutionary term “militia,” but also mandated a
20 percent reduction in their total strength but pay rises for the rest, new training, and more people-friendly
procedures.73 Behind the new law, though, was also a
concern about control of the police, a belief that they
were not always in control of the center. In 2008, for
example, Special Purpose Mobile Unit (OMON) riot
police had to be flown 3,750 miles from Moscow to
the Russian Far East when the Vladivostok leadership
and police decided not to disperse protesters. Whereas in the past local authorities paid a share of police
budgets—and often expected a say as a result—now it
is all covered by the federal treasury (which reduced
its subsidies to the regions to make up the difference).
The new reshuffle of the MVD was also an opportunity to reassert a degree of power by culling the senior
ranks of the ministry, with six of eight deputy ministers reshuffled.74 In other words, this was a reform
as much motivated by a desire to consolidate Kremlin
control over the law-enforcement agencies as by any
hope of making them more transparent, democratic,
responsive, or effective.
Even so, it is still high questionable how much
real control the center has over grass-roots law en-
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forcement and even over major structures, especially
given the periodic turf wars between elements of the
MVD, the Federal Counter-Narcotics Service (FSKN),
the Procurator General’s Office, and other law enforcement agencies.75 Nonetheless, the score is still a
respectable 30, driven largely by a changing appreciation of the advantages in change. Medvedev demonstrated a clear awareness that “legal nihilism” and
inefficient or corrupt policing had a sharply negative
impact on economic development and—by driving or
keeping business underground—also the tax base.76
Although Putin may prove less interested in police reform and its practical value, the Kremlin can certainly
afford it. The real question will be how far it can drag
the force behind it. See Figure 3-3.

Figure 3-3. Reform Prospects: The Police.
A direct comparison makes the distinctions even
more clear, with a baseline score of 9 (all “No” responses) and a pretty low divider of a 27 (all “Possible” responses). See Figure 3-4.

97

Figure 3-4. Comparison of Reform Prospects.
In short, even a relatively positive reading—this is,
after all, a question of the potential of reform, not a hard
prediction as to whether reform will be achieved—
would suggest that military reform, while not easy, is
most credible. The Sledovatel’ would presumably even
now be bringing in the suspect to browbeat or simply
beat a confession out of him. Police reform is certainly
possible, although as the final tabulation suggests,
the key issue relate to opportunity and mastering
the rank-and-file law enforcers. However, reform of
the security and intelligence apparatus—as opposed
to simple evolutionary development thanks to new
resources or technological improvements—seems as
distant as ever. See Figure 3-5.
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Figure 3-5. A Comparison of the Detailed Results.
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